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### Advantage 1 is Accountability

#### Accountability mechanisms that constrain the executive prevent drone overuse in Pakistan and Yemen

Benjamin R. Farley 12, JD from Emory University School of Law, former Editor-in-Chief of the Emory International Law Review, “Drones and Democracy: Missing Out on Accountability?” Winter 2012, 54 S. Tex. L. Rev. 385, lexis

Effective accountability mechanisms constrain policymakers' freedom to choose to use force by increasing the costs of use-of-force decisions and imposing barriers on reaching use-of-force decisions. The accountability mechanisms discussed here, when effective, reduce the likelihood of resorting to force (1) through the threat of electoral sanctioning, which carries with it a demand that political leaders explain their resort to force; (2) by limiting policymakers to choosing force only in the manners authorized by the legislature; and (3) by requiring policymakers to adhere to both domestic and international law when resorting to force and demanding that their justifications for uses of force satisfy both domestic and international law. When these accountability mechanisms are ineffective, the barriers to using force are lowered and the use of force becomes more likely.¶ Use-of-force decisions that avoid accountability are problematic for both functional and normative reasons. Functionally, accountability avoidance yields increased risk-taking and increases the likelihood of policy failure. The constraints imposed by political, supervisory, fiscal, and legal accountability "make[] leaders reluctant to engage in foolhardy military expeditions... . If the caution about military adventure is translated into general risk-aversion when it comes to unnecessary military engagements, then there will likely be a distributional effect on the success rates of [democracies]." n205 Indeed, this result is predicted by the structural explanation of the democratic peace. It also explains why policies that rely on covert action - action that is necessarily less constrained by accountability mechanisms - carry an increased risk of failure. n206 Thus, although accountability avoidance seductively holds out the prospect of flexibility and freedom of action for policymakers, it may ultimately prove counterproductive.¶ In fact, policy failure associated with the overreliance on force - due at least in part to lowered barriers from drone-enabled accountability avoidance - may be occurring already. Airstrikes are deeply unpopular in both Yemen n207 and Pakistan, n208 and although the strikes have proven critical [\*421] to degrading al-Qaeda and associated forces in Pakistan, increased uses of force may be contributing to instability, the spread of militancy, and the failure of U.S. policy objectives there. n209 Similarly, the success of drone [\*422] strikes in Pakistan must be balanced against the costs associated with the increasingly contentious U.S.-Pakistani relationship, which is attributable at least in part to the number and intensity of drone strikes. n210 These costs include undermining the civilian Pakistani government and contributing to the closure of Pakistan to NATO supplies transiting to Afghanistan, n211 thus forcing the U.S. and NATO to rely instead on several repressive central Asian states. n212 Arguably the damage to U.S.-Pakistan relations and the destabilizing influence of U.S. operations in Yemen would be mitigated by fewer such operations - and there would be fewer U.S. operations in both Pakistan and Yemen if U.S. policymakers were more constrained by use-of-force accountability mechanisms.¶ From a normative perspective, the freedom of action that accountability avoidance facilitates represents the de facto concentration of authority to use force in the executive branch. While some argue that such concentration of authority is necessary or even pragmatic in the current international environment, 168 it is anathema to the U.S. constitutional system. Indeed, the founding generation’s fear of foolhardy military adventurism is one reason for the Constitution’s diffusion of use-of-force authority between the Congress and the President. 169 That generation recognized that a President vested with an unconstrained ability to go to war is more likely to lead the nation into war.

#### Judicial review is key to prevent mistakes – executive targeting decisions are inevitably flawed and violent

Ahmad Chehab 12, Georgetown University Law Center, “RETRIEVING THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE TARGETED KILLINGS CONTEXT: A PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW,” March 30 2012, abstract available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572

The practical, pragmatic justification for the COAACC derives largely from considering social psychological findings regarding the skewed potential associated with limiting unchecked decision-making in a group of individuals. As an initial point, psychologists have long pointed out how individuals frequently fall prey to cognitive illusions that produce systematic errors in judgment.137 People simply do not make decisions by choosing the optimal outcome from available alternatives, but instead employ shortcuts (i.e., heuristics) for convenience.138 Cognitive biases like groupthink can hamper effective policy deliberations and formulations.139 Groupthink largely arises when a group of decision-makers seek conformity and agreement, thereby avoiding alternative points of view that are critical of the consensus position.140 This theory suggests that some groups—particularly those characterized by a strong leader, considerable internal cohesion, internal loyalty, overconfidence, and a shared world view or value system—suffer from a deterioration in their capacity to engage in critical analysis.141 Many factors can affect such judgment, including a lack of crucial information, insufficient timing for decision-making, poor judgment, pure luck, and/or unexpected actions by adversaries.142 Moreover, decision-makers inevitably tend to become influenced by irrelevant information,143 seek out data and assessments that confirm their beliefs and personal hypotheses notwithstanding contradictory evidence,144 and “[i]rrationally avoid choices that represent extremes when a decision involves a trade-off between two incommensurable values.”145 Self-serving biases can also hamper judgment given as it has been shown to induce well-intentioned people to rationalize virtually any behavior, judgment or action after the fact.146 The confirmation and overconfidence bias, both conceptually related to groupthink, also result in large part from neglecting to consider contradictory evidence coupled with an irrational persistence in pursuing ideological positions divorced from concern of alternative viewpoints.147¶ Professor Cass Sunstein has described situations in which groupthink produced poor results precisely because consensus resulted from the failure to consider alternative sources of information.148 The failures of past presidents to consider alternative sources of information, critically question risk assessments, ensure neutral-free ideological sentiment among those deliberating,149 and/or generally ensure properly deliberated national security policy has produced prominent and devastating blunders,150 including the Iraq War of 2003,151 the Bay of Pigs debacle in the 1960’s,152 and the controversial decision to wage war against Vietnam.153¶ Professor Sunstein also has described the related phenomenon of “group polarization,” which includes the tendency to push group members toward a “more extreme position.”154 Given that both groupthink and group polarization can lead to erroneous and ideologically tainted policy positions, the notion of giving the President unchecked authority in determining who is eligible for assassination can only serve to increase the likelihood for committing significant errors.155 The reality is that psychological mistakes, organizational ineptitude, lack of structural coherence and other associated deficiencies are inevitable features in Executive Branch decision-making.¶ D. THE NEED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY CHECKS¶ To check the vices of groupthink and shortcomings of human judgment, the psychology literature emphasizes a focus on accountability mechanisms in which a better reasoned decision-making process can flourish.156 By serving as a constraint on behavior, “accountability functions as a critical norm-enforcement mechanism—the social psychological link between individual decision makers on the one hand and social systems on the other.”157 Such institutional review can channel recognition for the need by government decision-makers to be more self-critical in policy targeted killing designations, more willing to consider alternative points of view, and more willing to anticipate possible objections.158 Findings have also shown that ex ante awareness can lead to more reasoned judgment while also preventing tendentious and ideological inclinations (and political motivations incentivized and exploited by popular hysteria and fear).159¶ Requiring accounting in a formalized way prior to engaging in a targeted killing—by providing, for example, in camera review, limited declassification of information, explaining threat assessments outside the immediate circle of policy advisors, and securing meaningful judicial review via a COAACC-like tribunal—can promote a more reliable and informed deliberation in the executive branch. With process-based judicial review, the COAACC could effectively reorient the decision to target individuals abroad by examining key procedural aspects—particularly assessing the reliability of the “terrorist” designation—and can further incentivize national security policy-makers to engage in more carefully reasoned choices and evaluate available alternatives than when subject to little to no review.

#### Scenario 1 is Yemen

#### Unaccountable drone strikes strengthen AQAP and destabilize Yemen

Jacqueline Manning 12, Senior Editor of International Affairs Review, December 9 2012, “Free to Kill: How a Lack of Accountability in America’s Drone Campaign Threatens U.S. Efforts in Yemen,” http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/450

Earlier this year White House counter-terrorism advisor, John Brennan, named al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen the greatest threat to the U.S. Since 2009, the Obama administration has carried out an estimated 28 drone strikes and 13 air strikes targeting AQAP in Yemen, while the Yemeni Government has carried out 17 strikes, and another five strikes cannot be definitively attributed to either state . There is an ongoing debate over the effectiveness of targeted killings by drone strikes in the fight against al-Qaeda. However, what is clear is that the secrecy and unaccountability with which these drone strike are being carried out are undermining U.S. efforts in Yemen.¶ The drone campaign in Yemen is widely criticized by human rights activists, the local population and even the United Nations for its resulting civilian casualties. It is also credited with fostering animosity towards the U.S. and swaying public sentiment in Yemen in favor of AQAP. The long-term effects, as detailed by a 2012 report by the Center for Civilians in Conflict, seem to be particularly devastating. The resulting loss of life, disability, or loss of property of a bread-winner can have long-term impacts, not just on an individual, but on an entire family of dependents.¶ The effectiveness of drone technology in killing al-Qaeda militants, however, cannot be denied. Targeted killings by drone strikes have eliminated several key AQAP members such as Anwar al-Awlaki, Samir Khan, Abdul Mun’im Salim al Fatahani, and Fahd al-Quso . Advocates of the counterterrorism strategy point out that it is much less costly in terms of human lives and money than other military operations.¶ While there are strong arguments on both sides of the drone debate, both proponents and critics of targeted killings of AQAP operatives by drones agree that transparency and accountability are needed.¶ Authorizing the CIA to carry out signature strikes is of particular concern. In signature strikes, instead of targeting individual Al Qaeda leaders, the CIA targets locations without knowing the precise identity of the individuals targeted as long as the locations are linked to a “signature” or pattern of behavior by Al Qaeda officials observed over time. This arbitrary method of targeting often results in avoidable human casualties.¶ Secrecy surrounding the campaign often means that victims and families of victims receive no acknowledgement of their losses, much less compensation. There are also huge disparities in the reported number of deaths. In addition, according to The New York Times, Obama administration officials define “militants” as “all military-age males in a strike zone...unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent” This definition leads to a lack of accountability for those casualties and inflames anti-American sentiment.¶ In a report submitted to the UN Human Rights Council, Ben Emmerson, special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism, asserted that, "Human rights abuses have all too often contributed to the grievances which cause people to make the wrong choices and to resort to terrorism….human rights compliant counter-terrorism measures help to prevent the recruitment of individuals to acts of terrorism." There is now statistical evidence that supports this claim. A 2010 opinion poll conducted by the New America Foundation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, where U.S. drone strikes have been carried out on a much larger scale, shows an overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes coupled with a majority support for suicide attacks on U.S. forces under some circumstances.¶ It is clear that the drone debate is not simply a matter of morality and human rights; it is also a matter of ineffective tactics. At a minimum the U.S. must implement a policy of transparency and accountability in the use of drones. Signature strikes take unacceptable risks with innocent lives. Targets must be identified more responsibly, and risks of civilian casualties should be minimized. When civilian casualties do occur, the United States must not only acknowledge them, but also pay amends to families of the victims.

#### Yemen instability undercuts the effectiveness of Middle East arms control measures---has global ripple effects

Dr. Ahmed Saif 12 is Executive Director of the Sheba Centre for Strategic Studies (SCSS), Sana’a, Yemen and Associate Dean at the Yemen College of Middle Eastern Studies, Professor of Politics at Sana’a University and Member of the editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Studies, Bahrain Centre for Strategic Studies, and Lars Berger is a Lecturer in Politics and Contemporary History of the Middle East at the University of Salford/ Manchester, United Kingdom, and Maurice Döring holds an MA in Political Science, International Law and Philosophy from the University of Bonn, and Ahmed Al-Wahishi is Executive Secretary of the Yemeni International Affairs Center (YIAC), Chief Representative of the League of Arab States Mission, May 2012, "Yemen and the Middle East Conference: The Challenge of Failing States and Transnational Terrorism," Policy Brief for the Middle East Conference on a WMD/DVs Free Zone, No. 7, May 2012, usir.salford.ac.uk/22952/1/Yemen\_and\_the\_Middle\_East\_Conference.pdf

Yemen’s ongoing domestic crisis has profound regional and global implications. This is due to the country’s unique combination of a geostrategically sensitive location, the stubborn weakness of state institutions, linkages with transnational terrorism, a prominent role in the regional weapons market, and, crucially, the suspected existence and use of nerve gas. These inter- related challenges might constitute a serious impediment to the short-term success and long-term sustainability of the Middle East Conference (MEC). This gathering on the establishment of a regional zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles (DVs) was mandated by the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In this context, Yemen’s ongoing domestic crisis thus requires urgent attention by policy-makers in the region and beyond.¶ The Importance of Yemen in the Context of the Middle East Conference¶ While in a geographical and political sense Yemen is far from being a central actor in the envisioned MEC, its political future could easily shape the gathering on several levels. First, the Middle East Conference aims at establishing a WMD/DVs Free Zone. On the one hand, Yemen is a party to all three legal documents banning weapons of mass destruction: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In addition, Sana’a has embraced the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) call for a Gulf WMD Free Zone, independent of Israeli nuclear policy. On the other hand, when it comes to the problématique of WMD and proliferation, Yemen might store chemical weapons, depending on whether rumors about the use of nerve gas against anti- government protesters in early 2011 turn out to be true. In addition, Yemen imported various WMD-capable aircraft and missiles and probably still operates most of them (see Table No. 1). In the aircraft realm, Yemeni decision-makers from the North, the South, and the unified country alike have mostly received Soviet/Russian fighter jets and bombers. 1¶ The current level of instability and the threat of further deterioration could thus spoil any serious arms control effort in Yemen. This is particularly troublesome since the country, given its history and affiliation with the Arab League, will have to be part of far-reaching regional disarmament initiatives. The prospect of an Arab state with an uncontrolled chemical arsenal is likely to affect Israeli and Iranian calculations with regard to the MEC. Both states are suspicious of the Arab League and tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which is particularly influential in Yemen, have recently worsened. ¶ Second, with a long history as one of the region’s eminent weapons markets, Yemen has the potential to serve as a major gateway for illicit weapons, both conventional and unconventional, entering the Arab peninsula and other parts of the Arab East. If the situation escalates, states with an interest in such technology might, for instance, try to obtain missiles and their spare parts or attempt to gain access to sensitive material from the country’s suspected chemical warheads. This could contribute to the proliferation of delivery systems as well as WMD thereby undermining the MEC. In 2011, protesters seized an army base in Sana’a, while Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) has, on a frequent basis, been able to temporarily control several cities and launch deadly assaults on military bases in the southern province of Abyan. Such developments could offer AQAP the chance to use existing dual-use laboratories or even to build their own facilities capable of producing biological and chemical material in remote areas under their control.¶ Third, Yemen has the potential to play a more prominent role in the ongoing tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Riyadh has a long history of attempts to shape the course of political events in Yemen with which it shares a 1,800 km-long border. Saudi Arabia’s different reactions to domestic calls for change in Bahrain and Syria have made clear that it is viewing the ‘Arab Spring’ primarily through the lens of its long-running conflict with Iran. From a Saudi point of view, instability in Yemen opens up the specter of increased Iranian influence at a time when Tehran’s foothold in the Arab world’s northern tier comes under strain in the context of the popular uprising against the Assad regime in Syria.¶ Fourth, a number of narrowly foiled terrorist attacks on U.S. targets and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting in Texas have shifted global attention towards Yemen’s status as the home to Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula. Continuing instability in Yemen allows AQAP to regroup and pose a direct threat to the security of Saudi Arabia and other countries on the Arab peninsula. It also puts AQAP into a position to intensify its support for the ‘home-grown’ attempted terrorist attacks the United States has witnessed over the last couple of years. In short, Yemen’s instability has the potential to allow transnational actors to undermine the security arrangements which the region’s state actors might contemplate as part of the envisioned MEC.

#### Arms control is key to prevent global warfare and mass violence

Harold Müller 2k, Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University, “Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement”, The Nonproliferation Review, 7(2), Summer 2000

In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists—and it exists today—constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task of global security policy. Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, arms races are likely to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or stabilization remains a key goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. • At the global level, arms limitation or prohibition agreements, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit themselves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. Global agreements also affect regional balances and help, if successful, to reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate. Under opportune circumstances, the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation.

#### Scenario 2 is Pakistan

#### Overuse of drones in Pakistan empowers militants and destabilizes the government

Michael J Boyle 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf>

The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few days—directly contradicts the long-term American strategic goal of boosting the capacity and legitimacy of the government in Islamabad. Drone attacks are more than just temporary incidents that erase all traces of an enemy. They have lasting political effects that can weaken existing governments, undermine their legitimacy and add to the ranks of their enemies. These political effects come about because drones provide a powerful signal to the population of a targeted state that the perpetrator considers the sovereignty of their government to be negligible. The popular perception that a government is powerless to stop drone attacks on its territory can be crippling to the incumbent regime, and can embolden its domestic rivals to challenge it through violence. Such continual violations of the territorial integrity of a state also have direct consequences for the legitimacy of its government. Following a meeting with General David Petraeus, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari described the political costs of drones succinctly, saying that ‘continuing drone attacks on our country, which result in loss of precious lives or property, are counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically elected government. It is creating a credibility gap.’75 Similarly, the Pakistani High Commissioner to London Wajid Shamsul Hasan said in August 2012 that¶ what has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. Because people really make fun of the democratic government—when you pass a resolution against drone attacks in the parliament and nothing happens. The Americans don’t listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.76¶ The appearance of powerlessness in the face of drones is corrosive to the appearance of competence and legitimacy of the Pakistani government. The growing perception that the Pakistani civilian government is unable to stop drone attacks is particularly dangerous in a context where 87 per cent of all Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the direction of the country and where the military, which has launched coups before, remains a popular force.77

#### Pakistan instability causes loose nukes and Indian intervention --- goes nuclear

Michael O’Hanlon 5, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and director of research for the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies

PhD in public and international affairs from Princeton, Apr 27 2005, “Dealing with the Collapse of a Nuclear-Armed State: The Cases of North Korea and Pakistan,” http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/ohanlon.pdf

Were Pakistan to collapse, it is unclear what the United States and like-minded states would or should do. As with North Korea, it is highly unlikely that “surgical strikes” to destroy the nuclear weapons could be conducted before extremists could make a grab at them. The United States probably would not know their location – at a minimum, scores of sites controlled by Special Forces or elite Army units would be presumed candidates – and no Pakistani government would likely help external forces with targeting information. The chances of learning the locations would probably be greater than in the North Korean case, given the greater openness of Pakistani society and its ties with the outside world; but U.S.-Pakistani military cooperation, cut off for a decade in the 1990s, is still quite modest, and the likelihood that Washington would be provided such information or otherwise obtain it should be considered small.¶ If a surgical strike, series of surgical strikes, or commando-style raids were not possible, the only option would be to try to restore order before the weapons could be taken by extremists and transferred to terrorists. The United States and other outside powers might, for example, respond to a request by the Pakistani government to help restore order. Given the embarrassment associated with requesting such outside help, the Pakistani government might delay asking until quite late, thus complicating an already challenging operation. If the international community could act fast enough, it might help defeat an insurrection. Another option would be to protect Pakistan’s borders, therefore making it harder to sneak nuclear weapons out of the country, while only providing technical support to the Pakistani armed forces as they tried to quell the insurrection. Given the enormous stakes, the United States would literally have to do anything it could to prevent nuclear weapons from getting into the wrong hands.¶ India would, of course, have a strong incentive to ensure the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. It also would have the advantage of proximity; it could undoubtedly mount a large response within a week, but its role would be complicated to say the least. In the case of a dissolved Pakistani state, India likely would not hesitate to intervene; however, in the more probable scenario in which Pakistan were fraying but not yet collapsed, India’s intervention could unify Pakistan’s factions against the invader, even leading to the deliberate use of Pakistani weapons against India. In such a scenario, with Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty on the line and its weapons put into a “use or lose” state by the approach of the Indian Army, nuclear dangers have long been considered to run very high.

#### Extinction

Greg Chaffin 11, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, July 8, 2011, “Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in South Asia,” online: http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting\_us\_security\_strategy\_in\_south\_asia

A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have disastrous effects on the world as a whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the global repercussions of a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would result in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter, which could very well place the survival of the human race in jeopardy. In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million. ¶ The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade, during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s ozone layer. The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and widespread political upheaval.

### Advantage 2 is Preventive War

#### US justifications for targeted killing will spill over to erode legal restraints on all violence and legitimize preventive war

Craig Martin 11, Associate Professor of Law at Washburn University School of Law, “Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defence, and the Jus Ad Bellum Regime,” Ch 8 in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW & MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD, p. 223, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1956141

IV. The potential impact of the targeted killing policy on international law

The United States has been engaging in this practice of using drone-mounted missile systems to kill targeted individuals since at least 2002.98 An increasing number of countries have employed different methods of targeted killing that constitute a use of force under jus ad bellum.99 The evidence suggests that the United States intends to continue and indeed expand the program, and there is a growing body of scholarly literature that either defends the policy’s legality, or advocates adjustment in international law to permit such action. There is, therefore, a real prospect that the practice could become more widespread, and that customary international law could begin to shift to reflect the principles implicit in the U.S. justification and in accordance with the rationales developed to support it.¶ Some of the implications of such an adjustment in the jus ad bellum regime are obvious from the foregoing analysis. As discussed, there would be a rejection of the narrow principle of self-defense in favor of something much closer to the Grotian concept of defensive war, encompassing punitive measures in response to past attacks and preventative uses of force to halt the development of future threats. The current conditions for a legitimate use of force in self-defense, namely the occurrence or imminence of an armed attack, necessity, and proportionality, would be significantly diluted or abandoned. Not only the doctrine of self-defense, but other aspects of the collective security system would be relaxed as well. Harkening back to Grotian notions of law enforcement constituting a just cause for war, the adjusted jus ad bellum regime would potentially permit the unilateral use of force against and within states for the purpose of attacking NSAs as such, in effect to enforce international law in jurisdictions that were incapable of doing so themselves.100 This would not only further undermine the concept of self-defense, but would undermine the exclusive jurisdiction that the U.N. Security Council currently has to authorize the use of force for purposes of “law enforcement” under Chapter VII of the Charter. Thus, both of the exceptions to the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force would be expanded.¶ In addition, however, the targeted killing policy threatens to create other holes in the jus ad bellum regime. This less obvious injury would arise from changes that would be similarly required of the IHL regime, and the resulting modifications to the fundamental relationship between the two regimes. These changes could lead to a complete severance of the remaining connection between the two regimes. Indeed, Ken Anderson, a scholar who has testified more than once on this subject before the U.S. Congress,101 has advocated just such a position, suggesting that the United States should assert that its use of force against other states in the process of targeted killings, while justified by the right to self-defense, does not rise to such a level that it would trigger the existence of an international armed conflict or the operation of IHL principles.102 If customary international law evolved along such lines, reverting to gradations in the types of use of force the change would destroy the unity of the system comprised of the jus ad bellum and IHL regimes, and there would be legal “black holes” in which states could use force without being subject to the limitations and conditions imposed by the IHL regime.¶ The structure of Harold Koh’s two-pronged justification similarly implies a severance of this relationship between jus ad bellum and IHL, albeit in a different and even more troubling way. His policy justification consists of two apparently independent and alternative arguments—that the United States is in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda and associated groups; and that the actions are justified as an exercise of self-defense. The suggestion seems to be that the United States is entitled on either basis to use armed force not just against the individuals targeted, but also against states in which the terrorist members are located. In other words, the first prong of the argument is that the use of force against another sovereign state, for the purposes of targeting Al Qaeda members, is justified by the existence of an armed conflict with Al Qaeda. If this is indeed what is intended by the policy justification, it represents an extraordinary move, not just because it purports to create a new category of armed conflict (that is, a “transnational” armed conflict without geographic limitation),103 but because it also suggests that there need be no jus ad bellum justification at all for a use of force against another state. Rather, the implication of Koh’s rationale is that the existence of an armed conflict under IHL can by itself provide grounds for exemption from the prohibition against the threat or use of force under the jus ad bellum regime.¶ This interpretation of the justifications cannot be pressed too far on the basis of the language of Mr. Koh’s speech alone, which he hastened to explain at the time was not a legal opinion.104 The two justifications could be explained as being supplementary rather than independent and alternative in nature. But the conduct of the United States in the prosecution of the policy would appear to confirm that it is based on these two independent justifications.105 The strikes against groups and states unrelated to the 9/11 attacks could be explained in part by the novel idea that force can be used against NSAs as such, wherever they may be situated. But even assuming some sort of strict liability for states in which guilty NSAs are found, that explanation still does not entirely account for the failure to tie the use of force against the different groups to specific armed attacks launched by each such group. This suggests that the United States is also relying quite independently on the argument that it is engaged in an armed conflict with all of these groups, and that the existence of such an armed conflict provides an independent justification for the use of force against the states in which the groups may be operating.¶ While the initial use of force in jus ad bellum terms is currently understood to bring into existence an international armed conflict and trigger the operation of IHL, the changes suggested by the policy would turn this on its head, by permitting the alleged existence of a “transnational” armed conflict to justify the initial use of force against third states. Whereas the two regimes currently operate as two components of an overall legal system relating to war, with one regime governing the use of force and the other the conduct of hostilities in the resulting armed conflict, the move attempted by the U.S. policy would terminate these independent but inter-related roles within a single system, and expand the role and scope of IHL to essentially replace aspects of the jus ad bellum regime. This would not only radically erode the jus ad bellum regime’s control over the state use of force, but it could potentially undermine the core idea that war, or in more modern terms the use of force and armed conflict, constitutes a legal state that triggers the operation of special laws that govern the various aspects of the phenomenon. There is a risk of return to a pre-Grotian perspective in which “war” was simply a term used to describe certain kinds of organized violence, rather than constituting a legal institution characterized by a coherent system of laws designed to govern and constrain all aspects of its operation.¶ There is a tendency in the U.S. approach to the so-called “global war on terror” to cherry-pick principles of the laws of war and to apply them in ways and in circumstances that are inconsistent with the very criteria within that legal system that determine when and how it is to operate. This reflects a certain disdain for the idea that the laws of war constitute an internally coherent system of law.106 In short, the advocated changes to the jus ad bellum regime and to the relationship between it and the IHL regime, and thus to the laws of war system as a whole,107 would constitute marked departures from the trajectory the system has been on during its development over the past century, and would be a repudiation of deliberate decisions that were made in creating the U.N. system after the Second World War.108¶ The premise of my argument is not that any return to past principles is inherently regressive. A rejection of recent innovations in favor of certain past practices might be attractive to some in the face of new transnational threats. The argument here is not even to deny the idea that the international law system may have to adapt to respond to the transnational terrorist threat. The point, rather, is that the kinds of changes to the international law system that are implicit in the targeted killing policy, and which are advocated by its supporters, would serve to radically reduce the limitations and constraints on the use of force by states against states. The modern principles that are being abandoned were created for the purpose of limiting the use of force and thus reducing the incidence of armed conflict among nations. The rejection of those ideas and a return to older concepts relating to the law of war would restore aspects of a system in which war was a legitimate tool of statecraft, and international armed conflict was thus far more frequent and widespread.109¶ The entire debate on targeted killing is so narrowly focused on the particular problems posed by transnational terrorist threats, and how to manipulate the legal limitations that tend to frustrate some of the desired policy choices, that there is insufficient reflection on the broader context, and the consequences that proposed changes to the legal constraints would have on the wider legal system of which they are a part. It may serve the immediate requirements of the American government, in order to legitimize the killing of AQAP members in Yemen, to expand the concept of self-defense, and to suggest that states can use force on the basis of a putative “transnational” armed conflict with NSAs. The problem is that the jus ad bellum regime applies to all state use of force, and it is not being adjusted in some tailored way to deal with terrorism alone. If the doctrine of self-defense is expanded to include preventative and punitive elements, it will be so expanded for all jus ad bellum purposes. The expanded doctrine of self-defense will not only justify the use of force to kill individual terrorists alleged to be plotting future attacks, but to strike the military facilities of states suspected of preparing for future aggression. If the threshold for use of force against states “harboring” NSAs is significantly reduced, the gap between state responsibility and the criteria for use of force will be reduced for all purposes. If the relationship between jus ad bellum and IHL is severed or altered, so as to create justifications for the use of force that are entirely independent of the jus ad bellum regime, then states will be entitled to use force against other states under the pretext of self-proclaimed armed conflict with NSAs generally.¶ We may think about each of these innovations as being related specifically to operations against terrorist groups that have been responsible for heinous attacks, and applied to states that have proven uniquely unwilling or unable to take the actions necessary to deal with the terrorists operating within their territory. But no clear criteria or qualifications are in fact tied to the modifications that are being advanced by the targeted killing policy. Relaxing the current legal constraints on the use of force and introducing new but poorly defined standards, will open up opportunities for states to use force against other states for reasons that have nothing to do with anti-terrorist objectives. Along the lines that Jeremy Waldron argues in chapter 4 in this volume,110 more careful thought ought to be given to the general norms that we are at risk of developing in the interest of justifying the very specific targeted killing policy. Ultimately, war between nations is a far greater threat, and is a potential source of so much more human suffering than the danger posed by transnational terrorism. This is not to trivialize the risks that terrorism represents, particularly in an age when Al Qaeda and others have sought nuclear weapons. But we must be careful not to undermine the system designed to constrain the use of force and reduce the incidence of international armed conflict, in order to address a threat that is much less serious in the grand scheme of things.

#### Robust norms restricting the use of force empirically prevent conflict escalation among great powers

John Vasquez 9, Thomas B. Mackie Scholar of International Relations and Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, PhD in Poli Sci from Syracuse University, “Peace,” Chapter 8 in The War Puzzle Revisited, p 298-299, google books

Wallensteen’s examination of the characteristics of particularist periods provides significant additional evidence that the steps-to-war analysis is on the right track. Realist practices are associated with war, and peaceful systems are associated with an emphasis on other practices. Peaceful systems are exemplified by the use of practices like buffer states, compensation, and concerts of power that bring major states together to form a network of institutions that provide governance for the system. The creation of rules of the game that can handle certain kinds of issues – territorial and ideological questions – and/or keep them off the agenda seems to be a crucial variable in producing peace.¶ Additional evidence on the import of rules and norms is provided in a series of studies by Kegley and Raymond (1982, 1984, 1986, 1990) that are operationally more precise than Wallensteen’s (1984) analysis. Kegley and Raymond provide evidence that when states accept norms, the incidence of war and military confrontation is reduced. They find that peace is associated with periods in which alliance norms are considered binding and the unilateral abrogation of commitments and treaties illegitimate. The rules imposed by the global political culture in these periods result in fewer militarized disputes and wars between major states. In addition, the wars that occur are kept at lower levels of severity, magnitude, and duration (i.e. they are limited wars).¶ Kegley and Raymond attempt to measure the extent to which global cultural norms restrain major states by looking at whether international law and commentary on it sees treaties and alliances as binding. They note that there have been two traditions in international law – pacta sunt servanda, which maintains that agreements are binding, and clausa rebus sic stantibus, which says that treaties are signed “as matters stand” and that any change in circumstances since the treaty was signed permits a party to withdraw unilaterally. One of the advantages the Kegley-Raymond studies have over Wallensteen (1984) is that they are able to develop reliable measures of the extent to which in any given half-decade that tradition in international law emphasizes the rebus or pacta sunt servanda tradition. This indicator is important not only because it focuses in on the question of unilateral actions, but because it can serve as an indicator of how well the peace system is working. The pacta sunt servanda tradition implies a more constraining political system and robust institutional context which should provide an alternative to war.¶ Kegley and Raymond (1982: 586) find that in half-decades (from 1820 to 1914) when treaties are considered non-binding (rebus), wars between major states occur in every half-decade (100 percent), but when treaties are considered binding (pacta sunt servanda), wars between major states occur in only 50 percent of the half-decades. The Cramer’s V for this relationship is .66. When the sample is expanded to include all states in the central system, Cramer’s V is 0.44, indicating that global norms have more impact on preventing war between major states. Nevertheless, among central system states between 1820 and 1939, war occurred in 93 percent of the half-decades where the rebus tradition dominated and in only 60 percent of the half-decades where the pacta sunt sevanda tradition dominated.¶ In a subsequent analysis of militarized disputes from 1820 to 1914, Kegley and Raymond (1984: 207-11) find that there is a negative relationship between binding norms and the frequency and scope of disputes short of war. In periods when the global culture accepts the pacta sunt servanda tradition as the norm, the number of military disputes goes down and the number of major states involved in a dispute decreases. Although the relationship is of moderate strength, it is not eliminated by other variables, namely alliance flexibility. As Kegley and Raymond (1984: 213) point out, this means “that in periods when the opportunistic renunciation of commitments” is condoned, militarized disputes are more likely to occur and to spread. The finding that norms can reduce the frequency and scope of disputes is significant evidence that rules can permit actors to successfully control and manage disputes so that they are not contagious and they do not escalate to war. These findings are consistent with Wallensteen’s (1984) and suggest that one of the ways rules help prevent war is by reducing, limiting, and managing disputes short of war.

#### Specifically, executive discretion over the legitimacy of targets will eviscerate legal restrictions on self-defense

Rosa Brooks 13, Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, “The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing,” http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/04-23-13BrooksTestimony.pdf

5. Setting Troubling International Precedents ¶ Here is an additional reason to worry about the U.S. overreliance on drone strikes: Other states will follow America's example, and the results are not likely to be pretty. Consider once again the Letelier murder, which was an international scandal in 1976: If the Letelier assassination took place today, the Chilean authorities would presumably insist on their national right to engage in “targeted killings” of individuals deemed to pose imminent threats to Chilean national security -- and they would justify such killings using precisely the same legal theories the US currently uses to justify targeted killings in Yemen or Somalia. We should assume that governments around the world—including those with less than stellar human rights records, such as Russia and China—are taking notice. ¶ Right now, the United States has a decided technological advantage when it comes to armed drones, but that will not last long. We should use this window to advance a robust legal and normative framework that will help protect against abuses by those states whose leaders can rarely be trusted. Unfortunately, we are doing the exact opposite: Instead of articulating norms about transparency and accountability, the United States is effectively handing China, Russia, and every other repressive state a playbook for how to foment instability and –literally -- get away with murder. ¶ Take the issue of sovereignty. Sovereignty has long been a core concept of the Westphalian international legal order.42 In the international arena, all sovereign states are formally considered equal and possessed of the right to control their own internal affairs free of interference from other states. That's what we call the principle of non-intervention -- and it means, among other things, that it is generally prohibited for one state to use force inside the borders of another sovereign state. There are some well-established exceptions, but they are few in number. A state can lawfully use force inside another sovereign state with that state's invitation or consent, or when force is authorized by the U.N. Security Council, pursuant to the U.N. Charter,43 or in self-defense "in the event of an armed attack." ¶ The 2011 Justice Department White Paper asserts that targeted killings carried out by the United States don't violate another state's sovereignty as long as that state either consents or is "unwilling or unable to suppress the threat posed by the individual being targeted." That sounds superficially plausible, but since the United States views itself as the sole arbiter of whether a state is "unwilling or unable" to suppress that threat, the logic is in fact circular. ¶ It goes like this: The United States -- using its own malleable definition of "imminent" -- decides that Person X, residing in sovereign State Y, poses a threat to the United States and requires killing. Once the United States decides that Person X can be targeted, the principle of sovereignty presents no barriers, because either 1) State Y will consent to the U.S. use of force inside its borders, in which case the use of force presents no sovereignty problems or 2) State Y will not consent to the U.S. use of force inside its borders, in which case, by definition, the United States will deem State Y to be "unwilling or unable to suppress the threat" posed by Person X and the use of force again presents no problem. ¶ This is a legal theory that more or less eviscerates traditional notions of sovereignty, and has the potential to significantly destabilize the already shaky collective security regime created by the U.N. Charter.44 If the US is the sole arbiter of whether and when it can use force inside the borders of another state, any other state strong enough to get away with it is likely to claim similar prerogatives. And, of course, if the US executive branch is the sole arbiter of what constitutes an imminent threat and who constitutes a targetable enemy combatant in an ill- defined war, why shouldn’t other states make identical arguments—and use them to justify the killing of dissidents, rivals, or unwanted minorities?

#### Now is key---US targeted killing is driving a global shift in strategic doctrines---results in nuclear war

Kerstin Fisk 13, visiting assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Loyola Marymount University, PhD in Political Science from Claremont Graduate University, and Jennifer M. Ramos, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Loyola Marymount University, PhD in Political Science from UC Davis, April 15 2013, “Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm,” International Studies Perspectives, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/doi/10.1111/insp.12013/full

Preventive self-defense entails waging a war or an attack by choice, in order to prevent a suspected enemy from changing the status quo in an unfavorable direction. Prevention is acting in anticipation of a suspected latent threat that might fully emerge someday. One might rightfully point out that preventive strikes are nothing new—the Iraq War is simply a more recent example in a long history of the preventive use of force. The strategic theorist Colin Gray (2007:27), for example, argues that “far from being a rare and awful crime against an historical norm, preventive war is, and has always been, so common, that its occurrence seems remarkable only to those who do not know their history.” Prevention may be common throughout history, but this does not change the fact that it became increasingly difficult to justify after World War II, as the international community developed a core set of normative principles to guide state behavior, including war as a last resort. The threshold for war was set high, imposing a stringent standard for states acting in self-defense. Gray concedes that there has been a “slow and erratic, but nevertheless genuine, growth of a global norm that regards the resort to war as an extraordinary and even desperate measure” and that the Iraq war set a “dangerous precedent” (44). Although our cases do not provide a definitive answer for whether a preventive self-defense norm is diffusing, they do provide some initial evidence that states are re-orienting their military and strategic doctrines toward offense. In addition, these states have all either acquired or developed unmanned aerial vehicles for the purposes of reconnaissance, surveillance, and/or precision targeting.¶ Thus, the results of our plausibility probe provide some evidence that the global norm regarding the use of force as a last resort is waning, and that a preventive self-defense norm is emerging and cascading following the example set by the United States. At the same time, there is variation among our cases in the extent to which they apply the strategy of self-defense. China, for example, has limited their adaption of this strategy to targeted killings, while Russia has declared their strategy to include the possibility of a preventive nuclear war. Yet, the preventive self-defense strategy is not just for powerful actors. Lesser powers may choose to adopt it as well, though perhaps only implementing the strategy against actors with equal or lesser power. Research in this vein would compliment our analyses herein.¶ With the proliferation of technology in a globalized world, it seems only a matter of time before countries that do not have drone technology are in the minority. While preventive self-defense strategies and drones are not inherently linked, current rhetoric and practice do tie them together. Though it is likely far into the future, it is all the more important to consider the final stage of norm evolution—internalization—for this particular norm. While scholars tend to think of norms as “good,” this one is not so clear-cut. If the preventive self-defense norm is taken for granted, integrated into practice without further consideration, it inherently changes the functioning of international relations. And unmanned aerial vehicles, by reducing the costs of war, make claims of preventive self-defense more palatable to the public. Yet a global norm of preventive self-defense is likely to be destabilizing, leading to more war in the international system, not less. It clearly violates notions of just war principles—jus ad bellum. The United States has set a dangerous precedent, and by continuing its preventive strike policy it continues to provide other states with the justification to do the same.

#### Credible external oversight is key to solve---the alternative is an anything-goes standard

Omar S. Bashir 12, is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University and a graduate of the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MIT, September 24th, 2012, "Who Watches the Drones?" Foreign Affairs,www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138141/omar-s-bashir/who-watches-the-drones

Further, the U.S. counterterrorism chief John Brennan has noted that the administration is "establishing precedents that other nations may follow." But, for now, other countries have no reason to believe that the United States carries out its own targeted killing operations responsibly. Without a credible oversight program, those negative perceptions of U.S. behavior will fill the vacuum, and an anything-goes standard might be the result. U.S. denunciations of other countries' programs could come to ring hollow. ¶ If the United States did adopt an oversight system, those denunciations would carry more weight. So, too, would U.S. pressure on other states to adopt similar systems: just as suspicions grow when countries refuse nuclear inspection, foreign governments that turned down invitations to apply a proven system of oversight to their own drone campaigns would reveal their disregard for humanitarian concerns.

#### A norm of preventive war pushes regional conflicts over the brink---causes China-Taiwan and Middle East nuclear war

James B. Steinberg 2, senior fellow and vice president and director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, Michael O’Hanlon, Director of Research for the 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings, Ph.D. from Princeton in public and international affairs, and Susan Rice, senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, “The New National Security Strategy and Preemption,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2002/12/terrorism-ohanlon

A final concern relates to the impact of the precedent set by the United States legitimating action that others might emulate, at the same time reducing its leverage to convince such countries not to use force. This concern is theoretical at one level, since it relates to stated doctrine as opposed to actual U.S. actions. But it is very real at another level. Today's international system is characterized by a relative infrequency of interstate war. Developing doctrines that lower the threshold for preemptive action could put that accomplishment at risk, and exacerbate regional crises already on the brink of open conflict.¶ Of course, no country will embark suddenly on a war of aggression simply because the United States provides it with a quasi-legal justification to do so. But countries already on the brink of war, and leaning strongly towards war, might use the doctrine to justify an action they already wished to take, and the effect of the U.S. posture may make it harder for the international community in general, and the U.S. in particular, to counsel delay and diplomacy.¶ Potential examples abound, ranging from Ethiopia and Eritrea, to China and Taiwan, to the Middle East. But perhaps the clearest case is the India-Pakistan crisis. Last spring, India was poised to attack Pakistan, given Pakistan's suspected complicity in assisting Islamic extremist terrorists who went from Pakistan into the disputed territory of Kashmir. A combination of U.S. pressure on both countries, with some last-minute caution by the leaders of Pakistan and India, narrowly averted a war that had the potential to escalate to the nuclear level once it began. Although India might have intended to limit its action to eliminating terrorist bases in Pakistan-held Kashmir and perhaps some bases inside Pakistan, nuclear-armed Pakistan might well have believed that India's intentions were to overthrow the regime in Islamabad or to eliminate its nuclear weapons capability. That situation would have further exacerbated the risks of escalation. Unfortunately, the terrorist infiltrations from Pakistan to Kashmir that did much to spark the earlier crisis appear to be resuming. Kashmir's status remains contentious, meaning that the risk of conflict remains.¶ Should the crisis resume, a U.S. policy of preemption may provide hawks in India the added ammunition they need to justify a strike against Pakistan in the eyes of their fellow Indian decision-makers. Recently, India Finance Minister (and former Foreign Minister) Jaswant Singh welcomed the administration's new emphasis on the legitimacy of preemption.

### Plan

#### The United States federal government should limit the President's war powers authority to assert, on behalf of the United States, immunity from judicial review by establishing a cause of action allowing civil suits brought against the United States by those unlawfully injured by targeted killing operations, their heirs, or their estates in security cleared legal proceedings.

### Solvency

#### The plan authorizes civil suits against the Federal Government for unlawful targeted killing operations --- that establishes legal norms and ensures compliance with the laws of war

Jonathan Hafetz 13, Associate Prof of Law at Seton Hall University Law School, former Senior Staff Attorney at the ACLU, served on legal teams in multiple Supreme Court cases regarding national security, “Reviewing Drones,” 3/8/2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-hafetz/reviewing-drones\_b\_2815671.html

The better course is to ensure meaningful review after the fact. To this end, Congress should authorize federal damages suits by the immediate family members of individuals killed in drone strikes.¶ Such ex post review would serve two main functions: providing judicial scrutiny of the underlying legal basis for targeted killings and affording victims a remedy. It would also give judges more leeway to evaluate the facts without fear that an error on their part might leave a dangerous terrorist at large.¶ For review to be meaningful, judges must not be restricted to deciding whether there is enough evidence in a particular case, as they would likely be under a FISA model. They must also be able to examine the government's legal arguments and, to paraphrase the great Supreme Court chief justice John Marshall, "to say what the law is" on targeted killings.¶ Judicial review through a civil action can achieve that goal. It can thus help resolve the difficult questions raised by the Justice Department white paper, including the permissible scope of the armed conflict with al Qaeda and the legality of the government's broad definition of an "imminent" threat.¶ Judges must also be able to afford a remedy to victims. Mistakes happen and, as a recent report by Columbia Law School and the Center for Civilians in Conflict suggests, they happen more than the U.S. government wants to acknowledge.¶ Errors are not merely devastating for family members and their communities. They also increase radicalization in the affected region and beyond. Drone strikes -- if unchecked -- could ultimately create more terrorists than they eliminate.¶ Courts should thus be able to review lethal strikes to determine whether they are consistent with the Constitution and with the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, which requires that such uses of force be consistent with the international laws of war. If a drone strike satisfies these requirements, the suit should be dismissed.

#### “Cause of action” creates a deterrent effect that makes officials think twice about drones---drawbacks of judicial review don’t apply

Stephen I. Vladeck 13, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship at American University Washington College of Law, senior editor of the peer-reviewed Journal of National Security Law and Policy, Supreme Court Fellow at the Constitution Project, and fellow at the Center on National Security at Fordham University School of Law, JD from Yale Law School, Feb 27 2013, “DRONES AND THE WAR ON TERROR: WHEN CAN THE U.S.TARGET ALLEGED AMERICAN TERRORISTS OVERSEAS?” Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Vladeck-02272013.pdf

At first blush, it may seem like many of these issues would be equally salient in the context of after-the-fact damages suits. But as long as such a regime was designed carefully and conscientiously, I believe that virtually all of these concerns could be mitigated. ¶ For starters, retrospective review doesn’t raise anywhere near the same concerns with regard to adversity or judicial competence. With respect to adversity, presumably those who are targeted in an individual strike could be represented as plaintiffs in a post-hoc proceeding, whether through their next friend or their heirs. And as long as they could state a viable claim for relief, it’s difficult to see any pure Article III problem with such a suit for retrospective relief.¶ As for competence, judges routinely review whether government officers acted in lawful self-defense under exigent circumstances (this is exactly what the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Tennessee v. Garner20 contemplates, after all). And if the Guantánamo litigation of the past five years has shown nothing else, it demonstrates that judges are also more than competent to resolve not just whether individual terrorism suspects are who the government says they are (and thus members of al Qaeda or one of its affiliates), but to do so using highly classified information in a manner that balances—albeit not always ideally—the government’s interest in secrecy with the detainee’s ability to contest the evidence against him.21 Just as Guantánamo detainees are represented in their habeas proceedings by security-cleared counsel who must comply with court-imposed protective orders and security procedures,22 so too, the subjects of targeted killing operations could have their estates represented by security-cleared counsel, who would be in a far better position to challenge the government’s evidence and to offer potentially exculpatory evidence / arguments of their own. And although the Guantánamo procedures have been developed by courts on an ad hoc basis (a process that has itself been criticized by some jurists), 23 Congress might also look to provisions it enacted in 1996 in creating the little-known Alien Terrorist Removal Court, especially 8 U.S.C. § 1534,24 as a model for such proceedings. ¶ More to the point, it should also follow that courts would be far more able as a practical matter to review the relevant questions in these cases after the fact. Although the pure membership question can probably be decided in the abstract, it should stand to reason that the imminence and infeasibility-of-capture issues will be much easier to assess in hindsight—removed from the pressures of the moment and with the benefit of the dispassionate distance that judicial review provides. To similar effect, whether the government used excessive force in relation to the object of the attack is also something that can only reasonably be assessed post hoc.¶ In addition to the substantive questions, it will also be much easier for courts to review the government’s own internal procedures after they are employed, especially if the government itself is already conducting after-action reviews that could be made part of the (classified) record in such cases. Indeed, the government’s own analysis could, in many cases, go a long way toward proving the lawfulness vel non of an individual strike.¶ As I mentioned before, there would still be a host of legal doctrines that would likely get in the way of such suits. Just to name a few, there is the present (albeit, in my view, unjustified) hostility to judicially inferred causes of actions under Bivens; the state secrets privilege;and sovereign and official immunity doctrines. But I am a firm believer that, except where the President himself is concerned (where there’s a stronger argument that immunity is constitutionally grounded),25 each of these concerns can be overcome by statute—as at least some of them arguably have been in the context of the express damages actions provided for under FISA. 26 So long as Congress creates an express cause of action for nominal damages, and so long as the statute both (1) expressly overrides state secrets and immunity doctrines; and (2) replaces them with carefully considered procedures for balancing the secrecy concerns that would arise in many—if not most—of these cases, these legal issues would be vitiated. Moreover, any concerns about exposing to liability government officers who acted in good faith and within the scope of their employment can be ameliorated by following the model of the Westfall Act, and substituting the United States as the proper defendant in any suit arising out of such an operation.27¶ Perhaps counterintuitively, I also believe that after-the-fact judicial review wouldn’t raise anywhere near the same prudential concerns as those noted above. Leaving aside how much less pressure judges would be under in such cases, it’s also generally true that damages regimes don’t have nearly the same validating effect on government action that ex ante approval does. Otherwise, one would expect to have seen a dramatic upsurge in lethal actions by law enforcement officers after each judicial decision refusing to impose individual liability arising out of a prior use of deadly force. So far as I know, no such evidence exists.¶ Of course, damages actions aren’t a perfect solution here. It’s obvious, but should be said anyway, that in a case in which the government does act unlawfully, no amount of damages will make the victim (or his heirs) whole. It’s also inevitable that, like much of the Guantánamo litigation, most of these suits would be resolved under extraordinary secrecy, and so there would be far less public accountability for targeted killings than, ideally, we might want. Some might also object to this proposal as being unnecessary—that, given existing criminal laws and executive orders, there is already a sufficiently clear prohibition on unlawful strikes to render any such damages regime unnecessarily superfluous. ¶ At least as to this last objection, it bears emphasizing that the existing laws depend entirely upon the beneficence of the Executive Branch, since they assume both that the government will (1) willfully disclose details of unlawful operations rather than cover them up; and (2) prosecute its own in cases in which they cross the line. Given both prior practice and unconfirmed contemporary reports of targeted killing operations that appear to raise serious legality issues, such as “signature strikes,” it doesn’t seem too much of a stretch to doubt that these remedies will prove sufficient.¶ In addition, there are two enormous upsides to damages actions that, in my mind, make them a least-worst solution—even if they are deeply, fundamentally flawed:¶ First, if nothing else, the specter of damages, even nominal damages, should have a deterrent effect on future government officers, such that, if a targeted killing operation ever was carried out in a way that violated the relevant legal rules, there would be liability—and, as importantly, precedent—such that the next government official in a similar context might think twice, and might make sure that he’s that much more convinced that the individual in question is who the government claims, and that there’s no alternative to the use of lethal force. Second, at least where the targets of such force are U.S. citizens, I believe that there is a non-frivolous argument that the Constitution may even compel at least some form of judicial process. 28 Compared to the alternatives, nominal damages actions litigated under carefully circumscribed rules of secrecy may be the only way to balance all of the relevant private, government, and legal interests at stake in such cases.¶ \* \* \*¶ In his concurrence in the Supreme Court’s famous decision in the Steel Seizure case, Justice Frankfurter suggested that “The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority.”¶ 29 It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that targeted killing operations by the Executive Branch present the legislature with two realistic choices: Congress could accept with minimal scrutiny the Executive Branch’s claims that these operations are carried out lawfully and with every relevant procedural safeguard to maximize their accuracy—and thereby open the door to the “unchecked disregard” of which Justice Frankfurter warned. Or Congress could require the government to defend those assertions in individual cases before a neutral magistrate invested with the independence guaranteed by the Constitution’s salary and tenure protections. So long as the government’s interests in secrecy are adequately protected in such proceedings, and so long as these operations really are consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, what does the government have to hide?

#### Ex post review creates a credible signal of compliance that restrains future executives

Kwame Holman 13, congressional correspondent for PBS NewsHour; citing Rosa Brooks, Prof of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, former Counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former senior advisor at the US Dept of State, “Congress Begins to Weigh In On Drone Strikes Policy,” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/04/congress-begins-to-weigh-in-on-drone-strikes-policy.html

While some experts have argued for court oversight of drone strikes before they're carried out, Brooks sides with those who say that would be unwieldy and unworkable.¶ Brooks says however an administration that knows its strikes could face court review after the fact -- with possible damages assessed -- would be more responsible and careful about who it strikes and why.¶ "If Congress were to create a statutory cause of action for damages for those who had been killed in abusive or mistaken drone strikes, you would have a court that would review such strikes after the fact. [That would] create a pretty good mechanism that would frankly keep the executive branch as honest as we hope it is already and as we hope it will continue to be into administrations to come," Brooks said.¶ "It would be one of the approaches that would go a very long way toward reassuring both U.S. citizens and the world more generally that our policies are in compliance with rule of law norms."

#### Only judicial oversight can credibly verify compliance with the laws of war

Avery Plaw 7, Associate Prof of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, PhD in Political Science from McGill University, “Terminating Terror: The Legality, Ethics and Effectiveness of Targeting Terrorists,” Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, No. 114, War and Terror (December 2007), pp. 1-27

To summarize, the general policy of targeting terrorists appears to be defensible in principle in terms of legality, morality and effectiveness. However, some specific targetings have been indefensible and should be prevented from recurring. Critics focus on the indefensible cases and insist that these are best prevented by condemning the general policy. States which target terrorists and their defenders have insisted that self-defense provides a blanket justification for targeting operations. The result has been a stalemate over terrorist targeting harmful to both the prosecution of the war on terror and the credibility of international law. Yet neither advocates nor critics of targeting appear to have a viable strategy for resolving the impasse. A final issue which urgently demands attention, therefore, is whether there are any plausible prospects for a coherent and principled political compromise over the issue of targeting terrorists.¶ Conclusion: the Possibility of Principled Compromise ¶ This final section offers a brief case that there is room for a principled compromise between critics and advocates of targeting terrorists. The argument is by example—a short illustration of one promising possibility. It will not satisfy everyone, but I suggest that it has the potential to resolve the most compelling concerns on both sides.¶ The most telling issues raised by critics of targeting fall into three categories: (1) the imperative need to establish that targets are combatants; (2) the need in attacking combatants to respect the established laws of war; and (3) the overwhelming imperative to avoid civilian casualties. The first issue seems to demand an authoritative judicial determination that could only be answered by a competent court. The second issue requires the openly avowed and consistent implementation of targeting according to standards accepted in international law—a requirement whose fulfillment would best be assured through judicial oversight. The third issue calls for independent evaluation of operations to assure that standards of civilian protection are robustly upheld, a role that could be effectively performed by a court.

#### Now is key and only the US can lead---lack of rules undermines all other norms on violence

James Whibley 13, received a M.A. in International Relations from Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, February 6th, 2013 "The Proliferation of Drone Warfare: The Weakening of Norms and International Precedent," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs,journal.georgetown.edu/2013/02/06/the-proliferation-of-drone-warfare-the-weakening-of-norms-and-international-precedent-by-james-whibley/

While drone advocates such as Max Boot argue that other countries are unlikely to follow any precedents about drone use established by America, power has an undeniable effect in establishing which norms are respected or enforced. America used its power in the international system after World War 2 to embed norms about human rights and liberal political organization, not only in allies, but in former adversaries and the international system as a whole. Likewise, the literature on rule-oriented constructivism presents a powerful case that norms have set precedents on the appropriate war-fighting and deterrence policies when using weapons of mass destruction and the practices of colonialism and human intervention. Therefore, drones advocates must consider the possible **unintended consequences of** lending legitimacy **to the** unrestricted use of drones. However, with the Obama administration only now beginning to formulate rules about using drones and seemingly uninterested in restraining its current practices, the US may miss an opportunity to entrench international norms about drone operations.¶ If countries begin to follow the precedent set by the US, there is also the risk of weakening pre-existing international norms about the use of violence. In the summer 2000 issue of International Security, Ward Thomas warned that, while the long-standing norm against assassination has always been less applicable to terrorist groups, the targeting of terrorists is, “likely to undermine the norm as a whole and erode the barriers to the use of assassination in other circumstances.” Such an occurrence would represent a deleterious unintended consequence to an already inhumane international system, justifying greater scrutiny of the drone program.¶ Realism cautions scholars not to expect ethical behaviour in international politics. Yet, the widespread use of drones by recent administrations with little accountability and the lack of any normative framework about their deployment on the battlefield could come to be seen as a serious strategic error and moral failing. If the Obama administration was nervous about leaving an amorphous drone policy to a possible Romney Presidency, then surely China or Russia possessing such a program would be terrifying.

# 2AC

### Case---AQAP High Now

#### Overuse of targeted killings in Yemen strengthens AQAP and fuels instability

Danielle Wiener-Bronner 12/13/13, staff writer at the Wire and former Web Editor for Reuters, “Latest Drone Strikes Shows How U.S. Strategy in Yemen Is Backfiring,” http://www.thewire.com/global/2013/12/yemen-drones/356111/

Targeted drone killings are defended by the United States as means to combat al-Qaeda in the most effective way possible. If attacks are carried out correctly, they should minimize civilian casualties, eliminate risk to our own forces, and remove dangerous militant operatives, ideally dismantling terrorist groups from a safe distance.¶ But if the attacks are not carried out correctly, as they often aren't, the results can backfire, which is exactly what's been happening in Yemen, according to Reuters: ¶ Tribal leaders, who have a lot of influence within Yemen's complex social structure, warn of rising sympathy for al Qaeda. Awad Ahmed Mohsen from Majallah, a southern village hit by a drone strike that killed dozens in 2009, told Reuters that America had brought hatred with its drones. Asked if more people joined al Qaeda in the wake of attacks that killed civilians, Mohsen said: "Definitely. And even those who don't join, now sympathize with al Qaeda because of these strikes, these violations. Any American they see, they exact revenge, even if it's a civilian."¶ On Thursday, 14 Yemeni civilians were killed by a U.S. drone strike that mistakenly targeted a wedding convoy, according to Yemeni national security officials. Another official, however, said AQAP militants may have been traveling with the wedding party, but in either case it seems that civilians were not the original targets have been killed. The CIA didn't comment on the strike, per standard procedure. The attack threatens to undo the U.S.'s efforts to scale back its drone program, while making it more palatable to the countries it affects.¶ Reuters reports that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has started traveling in smaller groups to avoid the aerial strikes, which may actually make it more difficult to track their motions. And the strikes are angering some Sunni Muslims upset about strikes that kill their supporters, rather than anti-government Shi'ite rebels, fueling sectarian tensions which are already high in the region.¶ If those killed in this week's attack are confirmed to be civilians, according to the Associated Press, it could mean a surge of anti-American sentiment in Yemen: ¶ Civilian deaths have bred resentments on a local level, sometimes undermining U.S. efforts to turn the public against the militants. The backlash in Yemen is still not as large as in Pakistan, where there is heavy pressure on the government to force limits on strikes — but public calls for a halt to strikes are starting to emerge.¶ In May, President Obama promised to increase transparency on the drone strike program and enhance guidelines on their use. But the Bureau of Investigative Journalism found in November that the six months following Obama's speech actually saw an increase of drone strike casualties in Yemen and Pakistan. ¶ Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reported in October that civilian casualties of drone strikes are higher than the U.S. admits. Around the same time, a U.N. human rights investigator said 400-600 of the 2,200 people killed by drones in the past decade were noncombatants. And in 2012, reports emerged that the Yemeni government works to help the U.S. hide it deadly errors. ¶ Data on drone strikes, like all counter-terrorism efforts, is necessarily shrouded in mystery, making it difficult to measure success. But if drone strikes continue to indiscriminately kill civilians, moderates in Yemen may be driven towards more extremist positions. Even governments working with Washington to coordinate the strikes could turn against the U.S. if drone casualties are not scaled back or eliminated.

### Case---AT: Circumvention

#### No circumvention---DC court decision

Ed Morrissey 13, Hot Air, "DC circuit slaps Obama administration for refusing to follow statutory law", August 14, hotair.com/archives/2013/08/14/dc-circuit-slaps-obama-administration-for-refusing-to-follow-statutory-law/

Could the Yucca Mountain case put the White House in a vise on the ObamaCare mandates? The DC Circuit Court of Appeals ruled yesterday that the Obama administration cannot ignore statutory law that requires the completion of the licensing process for the controversial nuclear storage site in Nevada, including a final decision on approval. The Obama administration had avoided complying with the federal law that designated Yucca Mountain as a repository for nuclear waste:¶ In a rebuke to the Obama administration, a federal appeals court ruled Tuesday that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been violating federal law by delaying a decision on a proposed nuclear waste dump in Nevada.¶ By a 2-1 vote, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered the commission to complete the licensing process and approve or reject the Energy Department’s application for a never-completed waste storage site at Nevada’s Yucca Mountain.¶ In a sharply worded opinion, the court said the nuclear agency was “simply flouting the law” when it allowed the Obama administration to continue plans to close the proposed waste site 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The action goes against a federal law designating Yucca Mountain as the nation’s nuclear waste repository.¶ “The president may not decline to follow a statutory mandate or prohibition simply because of policy objections,” Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh wrote in a majority opinion, which was joined Judge A. Raymond Randolph. Chief Judge Merrick B. Garland dissented.¶ As Glenn Reynolds wrote, “Seems like this might apply in quite a few situations.” The Obama administration has decided to ignore statutory language in the Affordable Care Act in order to delay enforcement of the employer mandate, out-of-pocket caps on insurance, and a few other aspects of the law it champions to this day. The Yucca Mountain case provides a similar scenario, and at least at the moment, legal precedent that would likely apply to an appeal of the waivers unilaterally imposed by President Obama.¶ The appeals court explicitly stated that a failure to bind a President to the statute has important implications for the principle of limited government — and so does the ObamaCare case. Once Congress passes a bill and a President signs it, it becomes binding law — binding on the President as well as everyone else. In order to “waive” a mandate at this point, Obama has to go back to Congress and ask them to modify the statute accordingly. Obama won’t do that because the House will insist on rolling back all of the mandates at the same time, and the Senate might actually go along with that approach after the serial disaster that this rollout has produced.¶ Instead, the formal constitutional-law scholar has convinced himself that statutes don’t apply to the President. The DC court of appeals has just given Obama a basic lesson in constitutional law, one that stretches from the Nevada mountainside to the doors of HHS. Perhaps the House might think about filing suit under this precedent to force Obama to come back to Congress.

#### Multiple incentives to comply

Richard H. Pildes 12, Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law at NYU School of Law and Co-Director of the NYU Center on Law and Security, April 2012, “Law and the President,” NYU School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-13, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012024

But as Levinson’s work helps to show, even on its own terms, Posner and Vermeule’s approach offers an incomplete account of the role of law. Levinson’s work, for example, is devoted to showing why constitutional law will be followed, even by disappointed political majorities, for purely instrumental reasons, even if those majorities do not experience any internal sense of duty to obey. He identifies at least six rational-choice mechanisms that will lead rational actors to adhere to constitutional law decisions of the Supreme Court: coordination, reputation, repeat-play, reciprocity, asset- specific investment, and positive political feedback mechanisms.76 No obvious reason exists to explain why all or some of these mechanisms would fail to lead presidents similarly to calculate that compliance with the law is usually important to a range of important presidential objectives. At the very least, for example, the executive branch is an enormous organization, and for internal organizational efficacy, as well as effective cooperation with other parts of the government, law serves an essential coordination function that presidents and their advisors typically have an interest in respecting. There is a reason executive branch departments are staffed with hundreds of lawyers: while Posner and Vermeule might cynically speculate that the reason is to figure out how to circumvent the law artfully, the truth, surely, is that law enables these institutions to function effectively, both internally and in conjunction with other institutions, and that lawyers are there to facilitate that role. In contrast to Posner and Vermeule, who argue that law does not constrain, and who then search for substitute constraints, scholars like Levinson establish that rational-choice theory helps explain why law does constrain. Indeed, as Posner and Vermeule surely know, there is a significant literature within the rational-choice framework that explains why powerful political actors would agree to accept and sustain legal constraints on their power, including the institution of judicial review.77¶ That Posner and Vermeule miss the role of legal compliance as a powerful signal, perhaps the most powerful signal, in maintaining a President’s critical credibility as a well-motivated user of discretionary power is all the more surprising in light of the central role executive self-binding constraints play in their theory. After asserting that “one of the greatest constraints on [presidential] aggrandizement” is “the president’s own interest in maintaining his credibility” (p. 133), they define their project as seeking to discover the “social-scientific microfoundations” (p. 123) of presidential credibility: the ways in which presidents establish and maintain credibility. One of the most crucial and effective mechanisms, in their view, is executive self-binding, “whereby executives commit themselves to a course of action that would impose higher costs on ill-motivated actors” (p. 137). As they also put it, “a well-motivated president can distinguish himself from an ill-motivated president by binding himself to a policy position that an ill-motivated president would reject” (p. 135). ¶ By complying with these constraints, presidents signal their good faith and accrue more trust to take further action. Most importantly from within Posner and Vermeule’s theory, these constraints, many self-generated through executive self-binding, substitute for the constraints of law. Law does not, or cannot, or should not constrain presidents, in their view, but rational-actor presidents recognize that complying with constraints is in their own self-interest; presidents therefore substitute or accept other constraints.¶ Thus, Posner and Vermeule recognize the importance of “enabling constraints”78 in effective mobilization and maintenance of political power; that is, they recognize that what appear to be short-term constraints on the immediate preferences of actors like presidents might actually enable longterm marshaling of effective presidential power. Yet they somehow miss that law, too, can work as an enabling constraint; when it comes to law, Posner and Vermeule seem to see nothing but constraint. Indeed, this failing runs even deeper. For if presidents must signal submission to various constraints to maintain and enhance their credibility — as Posner and Vermeule insist they must — Posner and Vermeule miss the fact that the single most powerful signal of that willingness to be constrained, particularly in American political culture, is probably the President’s willingness to comply with law. ¶ In theoretical terms, then, Posner and Vermeule emerge as inconsistent or incomplete consequentialists. Even if law does not bind presidents purely for normative reasons, presidents will have powerful incentives to comply with law — even more powerful than the incentives Posner and Vermeule rightly recognize presidents will have to comply with other constraints on their otherwise naked power. To the extent that Posner and Vermeule mean to acknowledge this point but argue that it means presidents are not “really” complying with the law and are only bowing to these other incentives, they are drawing a semantic distinction that seems of limited pragmatic significance, as the next Part shows.

#### Officials will be deterred even if the Prez is not

Walter Dellinger 6, Douglas B. Maggs Professor of Law at Duke University, former head of the Office of Legal Counsel, partner at O’Melveny & Myers in Washington, D.C., June 29 2006, “A Supreme Court Conversation,” http://www.slate.com/articles/life/the\_breakfast\_table/features/2006/a\_supreme\_court\_conversation/the\_most\_important\_decision\_on\_presidential\_power\_ever.html

I will expand upon this later tonight. But first, I must deal with your unwarranted fear that President Bush's administration might simply refuse to comply with the court's determinations, either openly or covertly. First of all, no one in this administration has ever suggested that the president would ever decline to obey Supreme Court decisions. But there is an even more practical restraint on noncompliance. The law officers of the government will not let that happen.¶ Yes, I know, actions have been taken in secret—prisons, torture, wiretapping, God knows what else. But many? most? of those actions have—to the extent of our knowledge—been approved by legal opinions from the Department of Justice and the White House counsel. Those legal opinions have seemed to very many lawyers to be fundamentally wrong in their assertions of sweeping unilateral presidential power to act in defiance of clearly valid laws. But, right or wrong, those legal opinions, signed and sealed on official government stationery, were a reality that gave substantial legal protection to government officers and agents who acted in compliance with what the lawyers found to be valid presidential directives.¶ No more. A lot of those legal opinions are inoperative as of 10 a.m. this morning. And without the cover of the now-discredited theory of sweeping unilateral executive power, the criminal law of the United States again controls.¶ Today the court holds that common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the conflict against al-Qaida. As Justice Kennedy expressly notes in his (controlling) concurring opinion, Section 2441 of the U.S. Criminal Code defines a "war crime" as including any conduct "which constitutes a violation of common Article 3 of the international conventions signed at Geneva." And the statute makes any "war crime"—when committed by any member of the U.S. Armed Forces, or against any member of the U.S. Armed Forces, or against a U.S. national—punishable by life imprisonment, or in certain cases, by death. Now that the fig leaf of untenable legal opinions has been stripped away, there will be great resistance by covered officials to complying with directives that may violate such a serious federal criminal statute.

#### Plaintiff’s estate can be represented by “next friend” under federal civil procedure

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ’13 – Current Rules of Civil Procedure in Federal Courts

http://law.widener.edu/civpro/Rulex17.htm

Rule 17. Plaintiff and Defendants; Capacity; Public Officers (a) Real party in interest. (1) Designation in General. An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. The following may sue in their names without joining the person for whose benefit the action is brought: (A) an executor; (B) an administrator; (C) a guardian; (D) a bailee; (E) a trustee of an express trust; (F) a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for another’s benefit; and (G) a party authorized by statute. (2) Action in the Name of the United States for Another’s Use or Benefit. When a federal statute so provides, an action for another’s use or benefit must be brought in the name of the United States. (3) Joinder of the Real Party in Interest. The court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action. After ratification, joinder, or substitution, the action proceeds as if it has been originally commenced by the real party in interest. (b) Capacity to Sue or be Sued. Capacity to sue or be sued is determined as follows: (1) for an individual who is not acting in a representative capacity, by the law of the individual’s domicile; (2) for a corporation, by the law under which it was organized; and (3) for all other parties, by the law of the state where the court is located, except that: (A) a partnership or other unincorporated association with no such capacity under that state’s law may sue or be sued in its common name to enforce a substantive right existing under the United States Constitution or laws; and (B) 28 U.S.C. §754 and §959(a) govern the capacity of a receiver appointed by a United States court to sue or be sued in the United States court. (c) Minor or Incompetent Person. (1) With a Representative. The following representatives may sue or defend on behalf of a minor or in incompetent person: (A) a general guardian; (B) a committee: (C) a conservator; or (D) a like fiduciary. (2) Without a Representative. A minor or an incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court must appoint a guardian ad litem – or issue another appropriate order – to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action. (d) Public Officer’s Title and Name. A public officer who sues or is sued in an official capacity may be designated by official title rather than by name, but the court may order that the officer’s name be added.

#### Obama will comply

Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb -- A Constitutional History”, Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis

In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also illuminates the practices of the President in creating the constitutional law of war powers at the "lowest ebb." Given the apparent advantages to the Executive of possessing preclusive powers in this area, it is tempting to think that Commanders in Chief would always have claimed a unilateral and unregulable authority to determine the conduct of military operations. And yet, as we show, for most of our history, the presidential practice was otherwise. Several of our most esteemed Presidents - Washington, Lincoln, and both Roosevelts, among others - never invoked the sort of preclusive claims of authority that some modern Presidents appear to embrace without pause. In fact, no Chief Executive did so in any clear way until the onset of the Korean War, even when they confronted problematic restrictions, some of which could not be fully interpreted away and some of which even purported to regulate troop deployments and the actions of troops already deployed.

Even since claims of preclusive power emerged in full, the practice within the executive branch has waxed and waned. No consensus among modern Presidents has crystallized. Indeed, rather than denying the authority of Congress to act in this area, some modern Presidents, like their predecessors, have acknowledged the constitutionality of legislative regulation. They have therefore concentrated their efforts on making effective use of other presidential authorities and institutional [\*949] advantages to shape military matters to their preferred design. n11 In sum, there has been much less executive assertion of an inviolate power over the conduct of military campaigns than one might think. And, perhaps most importantly, until recently there has been almost no actual defiance of statutory limitations predicated on such a constitutional theory.

This repeated, though not unbroken, deferential executive branch stance is not, we think, best understood as evidence of the timidity of prior Commanders in Chief. Nor do we think it is the accidental result of political conditions that just happened to make it expedient for all of these Executives to refrain from lodging such a constitutional objection. This consistent pattern of executive behavior is more accurately viewed as reflecting deeply rooted norms and understandings of how the Constitution structures conflict between the branches over war. In particular, this well-developed executive branch practice appears to be premised on the assumption that the constitutional plan requires the nation's chief commander to guard his supervisory powers over the military chain of command jealously, to be willing to act in times of exigency if Congress is not available for consultation, and to use the very powerful weapon of the veto to forestall unacceptable limits proposed in the midst of military conflict - but that otherwise, the Constitution compels the Commander in Chief to comply with legislative restrictions.

In this way, the founding legal charter itself exhorts the President to justify controversial military judgments to a sympathetic but sometimes skeptical or demanding legislature and nation, not only for the sake of liberty, but also for effective and prudent conduct of military operations. Justice Jackson's famous instruction that "with all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations" n12 continues to have a strong pull on the constitutional imagination. n13 What emerges from our analysis is how much pull it seemed to [\*950] have on the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.

### 2AC vs. Kritik

#### Aff reclaims agency---debating about war powers is uniquely important in educational settings

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

#### Here’s more ev---exec power has increased because of perceived public indifference

Aziz Rana 12, Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School; PhD., Harvard University, Connecticut Law Review July, 2012, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1417, “COMMENTARY: NATIONAL SECURITY: LEAD ARTICLE: Who Decides on Security?” lexis nexis

Despite over six decades of reform initiatives, the overwhelming drift of security arrangements in the United States has been toward greater-not less-executive centralization and discretion. This Article explores why efforts to curb presidential prerogative have failed so consistently. It argues that while constitutional scholars have overwhelmingly focused their attention on procedural solutions, the underlying reason for the growth of emergency powers is ultimately political rather than purely legal. In particular, scholars have ignored how the basic meaning of "security" has itself shifted dramatically since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War in line with changing ideas about popular competence. Paying special attention to the decisive role of actors such as Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter and Pendleton Herring, co-author of 1947's National Security Act, this Article details how emerging judgments about the limits of popular knowledge and mass deliberation fundamentally altered the basic structure of security practices. Countering the pervasive wisdom at the founding and throughout the nineteenth century, this contemporary shift has recast war and external threat as matters too complex and specialized for ordinary Americans to comprehend. Today, the dominant conceptual approach to security presumes that insulated decision-makers in the executive branch (armed with the military's professional expertise) are best equipped to make sense of complicated and often conflicting information about safety and self- defense. The result is that the other branches-let alone the public writ large-face a profound legitimacy deficit whenever they call for transparency or seek to challenge coercive security programs. Not surprisingly, the tendency of legalistic reform efforts has been to place greater decision-making power in the other branches and then to watch those branches delegate such power back to the executive.

#### Legal challenges are critical acts of resistance---even if it fails, resistance is life-affirming

Muneer I. Ahmad 9, is a Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School, 2009, “RESISTING GUANTÁNAMO: RIGHTS AT THE BRINK OF DEHUMANIZATION”, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 103, p. 1683, American University, WCL Research Paper No. 08-65

I argue that while we might hope for rights to obtain transformative effect—to close Guantánamo, for example, or to free those who are wrongfully imprisoned—at Guantánamo and in other places of extreme state violence, rights may do the more modest work of resistance. Rather than fundamentally reconfiguring power arrangements, as rights moments aspire to do, resistance slows, narrows, and increases the costs for the state‘s exercise of violence. Resistance is a form of power contestation that works from within the structures of domination.22 While it may aspire to overturn prevailing power relations, its value derives from its means as much as from its ends. Through resistance, new political spaces may open, but even if they do not, the mere fact of resistance, the assertion of the self against the violence of the state, is self- and life-affirming. Resistance is, in short, a way of staying human. This, then, is the work that rights do: when pushed to the brink of annihilation, they provide us with a rudimentary and perhaps inadequate tool to maintain our humanity. In Part I of this Article, I discuss the cultural erasure of the Guantánamo prisoners through the creation of a post-September 11 terrorist narrative, or what I term an iconography of terror, their legal erasure through the crea-tion of the now abandoned ―enemy combatant‖ 23 category and their physical erasure through torture. I contextualize these discussions with narrative descriptions of the place and space of Guantánamo, which I argue are necessary to understand the contextual nature of rights and rights claims, and the integral connection between law and narrative. In Part II, I deepen the discussion of legal erasure through critique and analysis of my representation of a teenage Canadian Guantánamo prisoner, Omar Khadr, in military commission proceedings, and through a doctrinal analysis of the shifting meanings of core legal terms in the Guantánamo legal regime. In so doing, I suggest how the experience of lawyering in and around Guantánamo helped to prove up its lawless nature. Part III considers the tactical, strategic, and theoretical values of adopting rights-based legal approaches in the rights-free zone of Guantánamo, paying particular attention to the value of rights as recognition, and ultimately arguing the importance of rights as a mode of resistance to state violence. In Part IV, I build upon this discussion of resistance by considering direct forms of resistance in which prisoners themselves have participated. In particular, I suggest the hunger strike as a paradigmatic form of prisoner resistance, and argue the lawyers‘ rights-based litigation and the prisoners‘ hunger strikes share a conceptual understanding of the relationship between rights, violence, and humanity. I conclude by reflecting on the value and limitations of reframing the work of the Guantánamo prisoners‘ lawyers as nothing more, but also nothing less, than resistance. I suggest that neither the resistance of the lawyers nor that of the prisoners may be enough to gain the prisoners‘ freedom, but that they are nonetheless essential when, as at Guantánamo, state violence is so extreme as to attempt to extinguish the human.

#### Cede the political disad---Debating the law teaches us how to make it better – rejection is worse

Todd Hedrick 12, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University, Sept, Democratic Constitutionalism as Mediation: The Decline and Recovery of an Idea in Critical Social Theory, Constellations Volume 19, Issue 3, pages 382–400

Habermas’ alleged abandonment of immanent critique, however, is belied by the role that the democratic legal system comes to play in his theory. While in some sense just one system among others, it has a special capacity to shape the environments of other systems by regulating their interaction. Of course, the legal system is not the only one capable of affecting the environments of other systems, but law is uniquely open to inputs from ordinary language and thus potentially more pliant and responsive to democratic will formation: “Normatively substantive messages can circulate throughout society only in the language of law … . Law thus functions as the ‘transformer’ that guarantees that the socially integrating network of communication stretched across society as a whole holds together.”55 This allows for the possibility of consensual social regulation of domains ranging from the economy to the family, where actors are presumed to be motivated by their private interests instead of respect for the law, while allowing persons directed toward such interests to be cognizant that their privately oriented behavior is compatible with respect for generally valid laws. While we should be cautious about automatically viewing the constitution as the fulcrum of the legal order, its status as basic law is significant in this respect. For, recalling Hegel's broader conception of constitutionalism, political constitutions not only define the structure of government and “the relationship between citizens and the state” (as in Hegel's narrower “political” constitution); they also “implicitly prefigure a comprehensive legal order,” that is, “the totality comprised of an administrative state, capitalist economy, and civil society.”56 So, while these social spheres can be conceived of as autonomous functional subsystems, their boundaries are legally defined in a way that affects the manner and degree of their interaction: “The political constitution is geared to shaping each of these systems by means of the medium of law and to harmonizing them so that they can fulfill their functions as measured by a presumed ‘common good’.”57 Thus, constitutional discourses should be seen less as interpretations of a positive legal text, and more as attempts to articulate legal norms that could shift the balance between these spheres in a manner more reflective of generalizable interests, occurring amidst class stratification and cultural pluralism.¶ A constitution's status as positive law is also of importance for fundamentally Hegelian reasons relating to his narrower sense of political constitutionalism: its norms must be public and concrete, such that differently positioned citizens have at least an initial sense of what the shared hermeneutic starting points for constitutional discourse might be. But these concrete formulations must also be understood to embody principles in the interest of all citizens, so that constitutional discourse can be the site of effective democratic will formation concerning the basic norms that mediate between particular individuals and the general interests of free and equal citizens. This recalls Hegel's point that constitutions fulfill their mediational function by being sufficiently positive so as to be publicly recognizable, yet are not exhausted by this positivity – the content of the constitution is instead filled in over time through ongoing legislation. In order to avoid Hegel's foreshortened conception of public participation in this process and his consequent authoritarian tendencies, Habermas and, later, Benhabib highlight the importance of being able to conceive of basic constitutional norms as themselves being the products of public contestation and discourse. In order to articulate this idea, they draw on legal theorists like Robert Cover and Frank Michelman who characterize this process of legal rearticulation as “jurisgenesis”58: a community's production of legal meaning by way of continuous rearticulation, through reflection and contestation, of its constitutional project.¶ Habermas explicitly conceives of the democratic legal order in this way when, in the context of considering the question of how a constitution that confers legitimacy on ordinary legislation could itself be thought to be democratically legitimate, he writes:¶ I propose that we understand the regress itself as the understandable expression of the future-oriented character, or openness, of the democratic constitution: in my view, a constitution that is democratic – not just in its content but also according to its source of legitimation – is a tradition-building project with a clearly marked beginning in time. All the later generations have the task of actualizing the still-untapped normative substance of the system of rights.59¶ A constitutional order and its interpretive history represent a community's attempt to render the terms under which they can give themselves the law that shapes their society's basic structure and secure the law's integrity through assigning basic liberties. Although philosophical reflection can give us some grasp of the presuppositions of a practice of legitimate lawmaking, this framework of presuppositions (“the system of rights”) is “unsaturated.”60 In Hegelian fashion, it must, to be meaningful, be concretized through discourse, and not in an one-off way during a founding moment that fixes the terms of political association once and for all, but continuously, as new persons enter the community and as new circumstances, problems, and perspectives emerge.¶ The stakes involved in sustaining a broad and inclusive constitutional discourse turn out to be significant. Habermas has recently invoked the concept of dignity in this regard, linking it to the process through which society politically constitutes itself as a reciprocal order of free and equal citizens. As a status rather than an inherent property, “dignity that accrues to all persons equally preserves the connotation of a self-respect that depends on social recognition.”61 Rather than being understood as a quality possessed by some persons by virtue of their proximity to something like the divine, the modern universalistic conception of dignity is a social status dependent upon ongoing practices of mutual recognition. Such practices, Habermas posits, are most fully instantiated in the role of citizens as legislators of the order to which they are subject.¶ [Dignity] can be established only within the framework of a constitutional state, something that never emerges of its own accord. Rather, this framework must be created by the citizens themselves using the means of positive law and must be protected and developed under historically changing conditions. As a modern legal concept, human dignity is associated with the status that citizens assume in the self-created political order.62¶ Although the implications of invoking dignity (as opposed to, say, autonomy) as the normative core of democratic constitutionalism are unclear,63 plainly Habermas remains committed to strongly intersubjective conceptions of democratic constitutionalism, to an intersubjectivity that continues to be legally and politically mediated (a dimension largely absent from Honneth's successor theory of intersubectivity).¶ What all of this suggests is a constitutional politics in which citizens are empowered to take part and meaningfully impact the terms of their cultural, economic, and political relations to each other. Such politics would need to be considerably less legalistic and precedent bound, less focused on the democracy-constraining aspects of constitutionalism emphasized in most liberal rule of law models. The sense of incompleteness and revisability that marks this critical theory approach to constitutionalism represents a point where critical theories of democracy may claim to be more radical and revisionary than most liberal and deliberative counterparts. It implies a sharp critique of more familiar models of bourgeois constitutionalism: whether they conceive of constitutional order as having a foundation in moral rights or natural law, or in an originary founding moment, such models a) tend to be backward-looking in their justifications, seeing the legal order as founded on some exogenously determined vision of moral order; b) tend to represent the law as an already-determined container within which legitimate ordinary politics takes place; and c) find the content of law to be ascertainable through the specialized reasoning of legal professionals.

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 On the critical theory conception of constitutionalism, this presumption of completeness and technicity amounts to the reification of a constitutional project, where a dynamic social relation is misperceived as something fixed and objective.64 We can see why this would be immensely problematic for someone like Habermas, for whom constitutional norms are supposed to concern the generalizable interests of free and equal citizens. If it is overall the case for him that generalizable interests are at least partially constituted through discourse and are therefore not given in any pre-political, pre-discursive sense,65 this is especially so in a society like ours with an unreconciled class structure sustained by pseudo-compromises. Therefore, discursive rearticulation of basic norms is necessary for the very emergence of generalizable interests.¶ Despite offering an admirably systematic synthesis of radical democracy and the constitutional rule of law, Habermas’ theory is hobbled by the hesitant way he embraces these ideas. Given his strong commitment to proceduralism, the view that actual discourses among those affected must take place during the production of legitimate law if constitutionalism is to perform its mediational function, as well as his opposition to foundational or backward-looking models of political justification, we might expect Habermas to advocate the continuous circulation in civil society of constitutional discourses that consistently have appreciable impact on the way constitutional projects develop through ongoing legislation such that citizens can see the links between their political constitution (narrowly construed), the effects that democratic discourse has on the shape that it takes, and the role of the political constitution in regulating and transforming the broader institutional backbone of society in accordance with the common good. And indeed, at least in the abstract, this is what the “two track” conception of democracy in Between Facts and Norms, with its model of discourses circulating between the informal public sphere and more formal legislative institutions, seeks to capture.66 As such, Habermas’ version of constitutionalism seems a natural ally of theories of “popular constitutionalism”67 emerging from the American legal academy or of those who, like Jeremy Waldron,68 are skeptical of the merits of legalistic constitutionalism and press for democratic participation in the ongoing rearticulation of constitutional norms. Indeed, I would submit that the preceding pages demonstrate that the Left Hegelian social theoretic backdrop of Habermas’ theory supplies a deeper normative justification for more democratic conceptions of constitutionalism than have heretofore been supplied by their proponents (who are, to be fair, primarily legal theorists seeking to uncover the basic commitments of American constitutionalism, a project more interpretive than normative.69) Given that such theories have very revisionary views on the appropriate method and scope of judicial review and the role of the constitution in public life, it is surprising that Habermas evinces at most a mild critique of the constitutional practices and institutions of actually existing democracies, never really confronting the possibility that institutions of constitutional review administered by legal elites could be paternalistic or extinguish the public impetus for discourse he so prizes.70 In fact, institutional questions concerning where constitutional discourse ought to take place and how the power to make authoritative determinations of constitutional meaning should be shared among civil society, legislative, and judiciary are mostly abstracted away in Habermas’ post-Between Facts and Norms writings, while that work is mostly content with the professional of administration of constitutional issues as it exists in the United States and Germany.¶ This is evident in Habermas’ embrace of figures from liberal constitutional theory. He does not present an independent theory of judicial decision-making, but warmly receives Dworkin's well-known model of “law as integrity.” To a certain extent, this allegiance makes sense, given Dworkin's sensitivity to the hermeneutic dimension of interpretation and the fact that his concept of integrity mirrors discourse theory in holding that legal decisions must be justifiable to those affected in terms of publicly recognizable principles. Habermas does, however, follow Michelman in criticizing the “monological” form of reasoning that Dworkin's exemplary Judge Hercules employs,71 replacing it with the interpretive activities of a specialized legal public sphere, presumably more responsive to the public than Hercules. But this substitution does nothing to alleviate other aspects of Dworkin's theory that make a match between him and Habermas quite awkward: Dworkin's standard of integrity compels judges to regard the law as a complete, coherent whole that rests on a foundation of moral rights.72 Because Dworkin regards deontic rights in a strongly realistic manner and as an unwritten part of the law, there is a finished, retrospective, “already there” quality to his picture of it. Thinking of moral rights as existing independently of their social articulation is what moves Dworkin to conceive of them as, at least in principle, accessible to the right reason of individual moral subjects.73 Legal correctness can be achieved when lawyers and judges combine their specialized knowledge of precedent with their potentially objective insights into deontic rights. Fashioning the law in accordance with the demands of integrity thereby becomes the province of legal elites, rendering public discourse and the construction of generalizable interests in principle unnecessary. This helps explain Dworkin's highly un-participatory conception of democracy and his comfort with placing vast decision-making powers in the hands of the judiciary.7¶ There is more than a little here that should make Habermas uncomfortable. Firstly, on his account, legitimate law is the product of actual discourses, which include the full spate of discourse types (pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral). If the task of judicial decision-making is to reconstruct the types of discourse that went into the production of law, Dworkin's vision of filling in the gaps between legal rules exclusively with considerations of individual moral rights (other considerations are collected under the heading of “policy”75) makes little sense.76 While Habermas distances himself from Dworkin's moral realism, calling it “hard to defend,”77 he appears not to appreciate the extent to which Dworkin links his account of legal correctness to this very possibility of individual insight into the objective moral order. If Habermas wishes to maintain his long held position that constitutional projects involve the ongoing construction of generalizable interests through the democratic process – which in my view is really the heart of his program – he needs an account of legal correctness that puts some distance between this vision and Dworkin's picture of legal elites discovering the content of law through technical interpretation and rational intuition into a fixed moral order.¶ Also puzzling is the degree of influence exercised by civil society in the development of constitutional projects that Habermas appears willing to countenance. While we might expect professional adjudicative institutions to play a sort of yeoman's role vis-à-vis the public, Habermas actually puts forth something akin to Bruce Ackerman's picture of infrequent constitutional revolutions, where the basic meaning of a constitutional project is transformed during swelling periods of national ferment, only to resettle for decades at a time, during which it is administered by legal professionals.78 According to this position, American civil society has not generated new understandings of constitutional order that overcome group divisions since the New Deal, or possibly the Civil Rights era. Now, this may actually be the case, and perhaps Habermas’ apparent acquiescence to this view of once-every-few-generations national conversations is a nod to realism, i.e., a realistic conception of how much broad based, ongoing constitutional discourse it is reasonable to expect the public to conduct. But while a theory with a Left Hegelian pedigree should avoid “the impotence of the ought” and utopian speculation, and therefore ought not develop critical conceptions of legal practice utterly divorced from present ones, such concessions to realism are unnecessary. After all, critical theory conceptions of constitutionalism will aim to be appreciably different from the more authoritarian ones currently in circulation, which more often than not fail to stimulate and sustain public discourse on the basic constitution of society. Instead, their point would be to suggest how a more dynamic, expansive, and mediational conception of constitutionalism could unlock greater democratic freedom and rationally integrated social identities.¶ Given these problems in Habermas’ theory, the innovations that Benhabib makes to his conception of constitutionalism are most welcome. While operating within a discourse theoretic framework, her recent work more unabashedly recalls Hegel's broader conception of the constitution as the basic norms through which a community understands and relates to itself (of which a founding legal document is but a part): a constitution is a way of life through which individuals seek to connect themselves to each other, and in which the very identity and membership of a community is constantly at stake.79 Benhabib's concept of “democratic iterations,” which draws on meaning-as-use theories, emphasizes how meaning is inevitably transformed through repetition:¶ In the process of repeating a term or a concept, we never simply produce a replica of the original usage and its intended meaning: rather, very repetition is a form of variation. Every iteration transforms meaning, adds to it, enriches it in ever-so-subtle ways. In fact, there is really no ‘originary’ source of meaning, or an ‘original’ to which all subsequent forms must conform … . Every iteration involves making sense of an authoritative original in a new and different context … . Iteration is the reappropriation of the ‘origin’; it is at the same time its dissolution as the original and its preservation through its continuous deployment.80¶ Recalling the reciprocal relationship that Hegel hints at between the narrow “political” constitution and the broader constitution of society's backbone of interrelated institutions, Benhabib here seems to envision a circular process whereby groups take up the conceptions of social relations instantiated in the legal order and transform them in their more everyday attempts to live with others in accordance with these norms. Like Cover and Michelman, she stresses that the transformation of legal meaning takes place primarily in informal settings, where different groups try (and sometimes fail) to live together and to understand themselves in their relation to others according to the terms they inherit from the constitutional tradition they find themselves subject to.81 Her main example of such democratic iteration is the challenge Muslim girls in France raised against the head scarf prohibition in public schools (“L’Affaire du Foulard”), which, while undoubtedly antagonistic, she contends has the potential to felicitously transform the meaning of secularity and inclusion in the French state and to create new forms of togetherness and understanding. But although Benhabib illustrates the concept of democratic iterations through an exemplary episode, this iterative process is a constant and pervasive one, which is punctuated by events and has the tendency to have a destabilizing effect on authority.82¶ It is telling, however, that Benhabib's examples of democratic iterations are exclusively centered on what Habermas would call ethical-political discourses.83 While otherwise not guilty of the charge,84 Benhabib, in her constitutional theory, runs afoul of Nancy Fraser's critical diagnosis of the trend in current political philosophy to subordinate class and distributional conflicts to struggles for cultural inclusion and recognition.85 Perhaps this is due to the fact that “hot” constitutional issues are so often ones with cultural dimensions in the foreground, rarely touching visibly on distributional conflicts between groups. This nonetheless is problematic since much court business clearly affects – often subtly and invisibly – the outcomes of these conflicts, frequently with bad results.86 For another reason why centering constitutional discourse on inclusion and cultural issues is problematic, it is useful to remind ourselves of Habermas’ critique of civic republicanism, according to which the main deficit in republican models of democracy is its “ethical overburdening” of the political process.87 To some extent, republicanism's emphasis on ethical discourse is understandable: given the level of cooperativeness and public spirit that republicans view as the font of legitimate law, political discourses need to engage the motivations and identities of citizens. Arguably, issues of ethical self-understanding do this better than more abstract or arid forms of politics. But it is not clear that this is intrinsically so, and it can have distorting effects on politics. In the American media, for example, this amplification of the cultural facets of issues is very common; conflicts over everything from guns to taxes are often reduced to conflicts over who is a good, real American and who is not. It is hard to say that this proves edifying; substantive issues of rights and social justice are elided, politics becomes more fraudulent and conflictual. None of this is to deny a legitimate place for ethical-political discourse. However, we do see something of a two-steps-forward-one-step-back movement in Benhabib's advancement of Habermas’ discourse theory of law: although her concept of democratic iterations takes center stage, she develops the notion solely along an ethical-political track. Going forward, critical theorists developing conceptions of constitutional discourse should work to see it as a way of integrating questions of distributional justice with questions of moral rights and collective identities without subordinating or conflating them.¶ 4. Conclusion¶ Some readers may find the general notion of reinvigorating a politics of constitutionalism quixotic. Certainly, it has not been not my intention to overstate the importance or positive contributions of constitutions in actually existing democracies, where they can serve to entrench political systems experiencing paralysis in the face of long term fiscal and environmental problems, and where public appeals to them more often than not invoke visions of society that are more nostalgic, ethno-nationalistic, authoritarian, and reactionary than what Habermas and Benhabib presumably have in mind. Instead, I take the basic Hegelian point I started this paper with to be this: modern persons ought to be able to comprehend their social order as the work of reason; the spine of institutions through which their relations to differently abled and positioned others are mediated ought to be responsive to their interests as fully-rounded persons; and comprehending this system of mediation ought to be able to reconcile them to the partiality of their roles within the universal state. Though modern life is differentiated, it can be understood, when seen through the lens of the constitutional order, as a result of citizens’ jointly exercised rationality as long as certain conditions are met. These conditions are, however, more stringent than Hegel realized. In light of this point, that so many issues deeply impacting citizens’ social and economic relations to one another are rendered marginal – and even invisible – in terms of the airing they receive in the public sphere, that they are treated as mostly settled or non-questions in the legal system consitutues a strikingly deficient aspect of modern politics. Examples include the intrusion of market logic and technology into everyday life, the commodification of public goods, the legal standing of consumers and residents, the role of shareholders and public interests in corporate governance, and the status of collective bargaining arrangements. Surely a contributing factor here is the absence of a shared sense of possibility that the basic terms of our social union could be responsive to the force that discursive reason can exert. Such a sense is what I am contending jurisgenerative theories ought to aim at recapturing while critiquing more legalistic and authoritarian models of law.¶ This is not to deny the possibility that democratic iterations themselves may be regressive or authoritarian, populist in the pejorative sense. But the denial of their legitimacy or possibility moves us in the direction of authoritarian conceptions of law and political power and the isolation of individuals and social groups wrought by a political order of machine-like administration that Horkheimer and Adorno describe as a main feature of modern political domination. Recapturing some sense of how human activity makes reason actual in the ongoing organization of society need not amount to the claim that reason culminates in some centralized form, as in the Hegelian state, or in some end state, as in Marx. It can, however, move us to envision the possibility of an ongoing practice of communication, lawmaking, and revision that seeks to reconcile and overcome positivity and division, without the triumphalist pretension of ever being able to fully do so.

#### Lack of legal challenges is causing Obama to carry out endless war with drones---he’s adopting the Bush/Cheney doctrine because of lack of accountability

Glenn Greenwald 13, J.D. from NYU, award-winning journalist, February 5th, 2013, "Chilling legal memo from Obama DOJ justifies assassination of US citizens," [www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/05/obama-kill-list-doj-memo](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/05/obama-kill-list-doj-memo)

The most extremist power any political leader can assert is the power to target his own citizens for execution without any charges or due process, far from any battlefield. The Obama administration has not only asserted exactly that power in theory, but has exercised it in practice. In September 2011, it killed US citizen Anwar Awlaki in a drone strike in Yemen, along with US citizen Samir Khan, and then, in circumstances that are still unexplained, two weeks later killed Awlaki's 16-year-old American son Abdulrahman with a separate drone strike in Yemen.¶ Since then, senior Obama officials including Attorney General Eric Holder and John Brennan, Obama's top terrorism adviser and his current nominee to lead the CIA, have explicitly argued that the president is and should be vested with this power. Meanwhile, a Washington Post article from October reported that the administration is formally institutionalizing this president's power to decide who dies under the Orwellian title "disposition matrix".¶ When the New York Times back in April, 2010 first confirmed the existence of Obama's hit list, it made clear just what an extremist power this is, noting: "It is extremely rare, if not unprecedented, for an American to be approved for targeted killing." The NYT quoted a Bush intelligence official as saying "he did not know of any American who was approved for targeted killing under the former president". When the existence of Obama's hit list was first reported several months earlier by the Washington Post's Dana Priest, she wrote that the "list includes three Americans".¶ What has made these actions all the more radical is the absolute secrecy with which Obama has draped all of this. Not only is the entire process carried out solely within the Executive branch - with no checks or oversight of any kind - but there is zero transparency and zero accountability. The president's underlings compile their proposed lists of who should be executed, and the president - at a charming weekly event dubbed by White House aides as "Terror Tuesday" - then chooses from "baseball cards" and decrees in total secrecy who should die. The power of accuser, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner are all consolidated in this one man, and those powers are exercised in the dark.¶ In fact, The Most Transparent Administration Ever™ has been so fixated on secrecy that they have refused even to disclose the legal memoranda prepared by Obama lawyers setting forth their legal rationale for why the president has this power. During the Bush years, when Bush refused to disclose the memoranda from his Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that legally authorized torture, rendition, warrantless eavesdropping and the like, leading Democratic lawyers such as Dawn Johnsen (Obama's first choice to lead the OLC) vehemently denounced this practice as a grave threat, warning that "the Bush Administration's excessive reliance on 'secret law' threatens the effective functioning of American democracy" and "the withholding from Congress and the public of legal interpretations by the [OLC] upsets the system of checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches of government."¶ But when it comes to Obama's assassination power, this is exactly what his administration has done. It has repeatedly refused to disclose the principal legal memoranda prepared by Obama OLC lawyers that justified his kill list. It is, right now, vigorously resisting lawsuits from the New York Times and the ACLU to obtain that OLC memorandum. In sum, Obama not only claims he has the power to order US citizens killed with no transparency, but that even the documents explaining the legal rationale for this power are to be concealed. He's maintaining secret law on the most extremist power he can assert.¶ Last night, NBC News' Michael Isikoff released a 16-page "white paper" prepared by the Obama DOJ that purports to justify Obama's power to target even Americans for assassination without due process (the memo is embedded in full below). This is not the primary OLC memo justifying Obama's kill list - that is still concealed - but it appears to track the reasoning of that memo as anonymously described to the New York Times in October 2011.¶ This new memo is entitled: "Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a US Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or An Associated Force". It claims its conclusion is "reached with recognition of the extraordinary seriousness of a lethal operation by the United States against a US citizen". Yet it is every bit as chilling as the Bush OLC torture memos in how its clinical, legalistic tone completely sanitizes the radical and dangerous power it purports to authorize.¶ I've written many times at length about why the Obama assassination program is such an extreme and radical threat - see here for one of the most comprehensive discussions, with documentation of how completely all of this violates Obama and Holder's statements before obtaining power - and won't repeat those arguments here. Instead, there are numerous points that should be emphasized about the fundamentally misleading nature of this new memo:¶ 1. Equating government accusations with guilt¶ The core distortion of the War on Terror under both Bush and Obama is the Orwellian practice of equating government accusations of terrorism with proof of guilt. One constantly hears US government defenders referring to "terrorists" when what they actually mean is: those accused by the government of terrorism. This entire memo is grounded in this deceit.¶ Time and again, it emphasizes that the authorized assassinations are carried out "against a senior operational leader of al-Qaida or its associated forces who poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States." Undoubtedly fearing that this document would one day be public, Obama lawyers made certain to incorporate this deceit into the title itself: "Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a US Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of al-Qaida or An Associated Force."¶ This ensures that huge numbers of citizens - those who spend little time thinking about such things and/or authoritarians who assume all government claims are true - will instinctively justify what is being done here on the ground that we must kill the Terrorists or joining al-Qaida means you should be killed. That's the "reasoning" process that has driven the War on Terror since it commenced: if the US government simply asserts without evidence or trial that someone is a terrorist, then they are assumed to be, and they can then be punished as such - with indefinite imprisonment or death.¶ But of course, when this memo refers to "a Senior Operational Leader of al-Qaida", what it actually means is this: someone whom the President - in total secrecy and with no due process - has accused of being that. Indeed, the memo itself makes this clear, as it baldly states that presidential assassinations are justified when "an informed, high-level official of the US government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the US".¶ This is the crucial point: the memo isn't justifying the due-process-free execution of senior al-Qaida leaders who pose an imminent threat to the US. It is justifying the due-process-free execution of people secretly accused by the president and his underlings, with no due process, of being that. The distinction between (a) government accusations and (b) proof of guilt is central to every free society, by definition, yet this memo - and those who defend Obama's assassination power - willfully ignore it.¶ Those who justify all of this by arguing that Obama can and should kill al-Qaida leaders who are trying to kill Americans are engaged in supreme question-begging. Without any due process, transparency or oversight, there is no way to know who is a "senior al-Qaida leader" and who is posing an "imminent threat" to Americans. All that can be known is who Obama, in total secrecy, accuses of this.¶ (Indeed, membership in al-Qaida is not even required to be assassinated, as one can be a member of a group deemed to be an "associated force" of al-Qaida, whatever that might mean: a formulation so broad and ill-defined that, as Law Professor Kevin Jon Heller argues, it means the memo "authorizes the use of lethal force against individuals whose targeting is, without more, prohibited by international law".)¶ The definition of an extreme authoritarian is one who is willing blindly to assume that government accusations are true without any evidence presented or opportunity to contest those accusations. This memo - and the entire theory justifying Obama's kill list - centrally relies on this authoritarian conflation of government accusations and valid proof of guilt.¶ They are not the same and never have been. Political leaders who decree guilt in secret and with no oversight inevitably succumb to error and/or abuse of power. Such unchecked accusatory decrees are inherently untrustworthy (indeed, Yemen experts have vehemently contested the claim that Awlaki himself was a senior al-Qaida leader posing an imminent threat to the US). That's why due process is guaranteed in the Constitution and why judicial review of government accusations has been a staple of western justice since the Magna Carta: because leaders can't be trusted to decree guilt and punish citizens without evidence and an adversarial process. That is the age-old basic right on which this memo, and the Obama presidency, is waging war.¶ 2. Creating a ceiling, not a floor¶ The most vital fact to note about this memorandum is that it is not purporting to impose requirements on the president's power to assassinate US citizens. When it concludes that the president has the authority to assassinate "a Senior Operational Leader of al-Qaida" who "poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the US" where capture is "infeasible", it is not concluding that assassinations are permissible only in those circumstances.¶ To the contrary, the memo expressly makes clear that presidential assassinations may be permitted even when none of those circumstances prevail: "This paper does not attempt to determine the minimum requirements necessary to render such an operation lawful." Instead, as the last line of the memo states: "it concludes only that the stated conditions would be sufficient to make lawful a lethal operation" - not that such conditions are necessary to find these assassinations legal. The memo explicitly leaves open the possibility that presidential assassinations of US citizens may be permissible even when the target is not a senior al-Qaida leader posing an imminent threat and/or when capture is feasible.¶ Critically, the rationale of the memo - that the US is engaged in a global war against al-Qaida and "associated forces" - can be easily used to justify presidential assassinations of US citizens in circumstances far beyond the ones described in this memo. If you believe the president has the power to execute US citizens based on the accusation that the citizen has joined al-Qaida, what possible limiting principle can you cite as to why that shouldn't apply to a low-level al-Qaida member, including ones found in places where capture may be feasible (including US soil)? The purported limitations on this power set forth in this memo, aside from being incredibly vague, can be easily discarded once the central theory of presidential power is embraced.¶ 3. Relies on the core Bush/Cheney theory of a global battlefield¶ The primary theory embraced by the Bush administration to justify its War on Terror policies was that the "battlefield" is no longer confined to identifiable geographical areas, but instead, the entire globe is now one big, unlimited "battlefield". That theory is both radical and dangerous because a president's powers are basically omnipotent on a "battlefield". There, state power is shielded from law, from courts, from constitutional guarantees, from all forms of accountability: anyone on a battlefield can be killed or imprisoned without charges. Thus, to posit the world as a battlefield is, by definition, to create an imperial, omnipotent presidency. That is the radical theory that unleashed all the rest of the controversial and lawless Bush/Cheney policies.¶ This "world-is-a-battlefield" theory was once highly controversial among Democrats. John Kerry famously denounced it when running for president, arguing instead that the effort against terrorism is "primarily an intelligence and law enforcement operation that requires cooperation around the world".¶ But this global-war theory is exactly what lies at heart of the Obama approach to Terrorism generally and this memo specifically. It is impossible to defend Obama's assassination powers without embracing it (which is why key Obama officials have consistently done so). That's because these assassinations are taking place in countries far from any war zone, such as Yemen and Somalia. You can't defend the application of "war powers" in these countries without embracing the once-very-controversial Bush/Cheney view that the whole is now a "battlefield" and the president's war powers thus exist without geographic limits.¶ This new memo makes clear that this Bush/Cheney worldview is at the heart of the Obama presidency. The president, it claims, "retains authority to use force against al-Qaida and associated forces outside the area of active hostilities". In other words: there are, subject to the entirely optional "feasibility of capture" element, no geographic limits to the president's authority to kill anyone he wants. This power applies not only to war zones, but everywhere in the world that he claims a member of al-Qaida is found. This memo embraces and institutionalizes the core Bush/Cheney theory that justified the entire panoply of policies Democrats back then pretended to find so objectionable.

#### Congress checks on exec terror policy prevents state of exception

Mitzen 11 Dr. Jennifer, Associate Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University and Michael Newell, PhD student in Political Science at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, “Crisis Authority, the War on Terror and the Future of Constitutional Democracy,” JUROS Arts & Humanities Vol. 2, http://libeas01.it.ohio-state.edu/ojs/index.php/juros/article/download/1265/1791

As Benjamin Wittes notes, the “presidential power model has failed,” and “Only Congress can ultimately write the law of this long war” (Wittes, 2008). The pursuit of terrorist policies through the exception has not resulted in clear, transparent and legally correct outcomes because the exception has been entirely controlled by “unilateral presidential actions” (Wittes, 2008). Instead, Congress “can build comprehensive legal systems and do so in the name of the political system as a whole” (Wittes, 2008). What this would entail would be a “law of terrorism” that would “at once restrain and empower the executive branch” in its actions in the War on Terror (Wittes, 2008). Simply allowing the executive to continue to unilaterally decide the fate of suspected terrorists and anti-terrorism policy will prove Agamben correct: that the American system of checks on power has been replaced with the primacy of the executive. It should then be Congress’ goal to step forward and outline the exact legal policies in the War on Terror, allowing President Obama this role will only prolong the elements of the exception that Agamben has given such dire warnings about.¶ Conclusion¶ The state of exception has been the standard response to crises for American presidents and other world leaders since the emergence of constitutional law and democratic government. Its creation and longevity as a political and legal tool should not be surprising. Constitutional democracies were not and are not designed to have laws and rules governing every potential complication that the country could face. Instead, it has been consistently argued that exceptional times require exceptional measures. The use of these measures when the public is ready and willing to accept the securitizing speech-act almost invariably lead to breaches of the law, and in Agamben’s opinion the expansion of executive authority. The War on Terror has seemingly reinforced Agamben’s argument, as the breadth and magnitude of legal issues resulting from this war have made the legal recovery extremely complicated.¶ However, some scholars suggest that the War on Terror has actually undermined the ability of the sovereign to invoke the state of exception, stating that instead:¶ In so far as it pursues this end, the effect of such commentary is to compound efforts to curtail the experience of deciding on/in the exception – efforts that are already well under way at Guantánamo Bay. For notwithstanding all the liberal heartache that they provoke, the law and legal institutions of Guantánamo Bay are working to negate the exception (Johns, 2005).¶ Johns suggests that the policies of the War on Terror are leading towards a tendency to condemn the state of exception and crisis authority. Johns bases his argument in the abundance of legal scholarship calling for “a newly fashioned emergency regime” that would “rescue the concept [of emergency power] from fascist thinkers like Carl Schmitt” (Johns, 2005). This logic would suggest that Agamben’s prediction is not coming true, that the executive will now be limited by what actions they can pursue during future crises and that the legal authority acquired by the executive during the War on Terror has been ceded back to its designated proprietors.¶ But for Johns to be proven right, it requires a change in long established habits. Citizens cannot expect the executive to singularly react to any complication the country faces. Indeed, Agamben’s warnings and the results of the War on Terror suggest that doing so will continue to produce dissatisfying results at best, immoral quagmires at worst. For democracy and constitutional governance to survive, it is the responsibility of officials and citizens alike to adapt existing legal structures to novel threats, and to not rely on executive mandate alone.

#### Alt fails

Robert Sinnerbrink 5, Professor of Philosophy at Macquarie University, Critical Horizons, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 258-259

Foucault and Agamben leave us with a stark alternative: either to take the ethical turn towards practices of freedom compatible with neo-liberalist governmentality, or accelerate biopolitical nihilism in the hope that a messianic overcoming of the breach between bare life and sovereign power will institute a redeemed human community. In short, affirm pragmatic practices of ethical self-formation, or prepare for the messianic overcoming of biopolitical domination. These alternatives, however, seem partial and inadequate. Foucault’s turn to ethics and liberalism underplays the political urgency of confronting societies of biopolitical control; this is a point not lost on Deleuze and taken up by Hardt and Negri in their neo-Marxist version of biopolitical production.70 Agamben’s despairing account of biopolitical nihilism, on the other hand, overemphasises the ontological ‘sameness’ of biopower regimes, and retreats from concrete politics into a metaphysical messianism prophetically gesturing towards a utopian community to come. What my brief genealogy of biopower and biopolitics suggests, then, is the need to find a path between these alternatives. We should retain the Foucaultian emphasis on a critical analysis of biopower without acquiescing to an ethical accommodation with neo-liberalism. And we ought to affirm Agamben’s profound questioning of the biopolitical foundations of modernity without succumbing to a utopian metaphysical messianism. We also need to question the Heideggerian metaphysical critique of modernity that has profoundly marked both Foucaultian and Agambenian conceptions of biopower and biopolitics. Finally, this genealogy suggests the need to restore the experience of injustice, the suffering of human beings, to any philosophical account of biopolitics, and to articulate political responses to biopower that go beyond ethical acquiescence and metaphysical longing.

#### Democracy checks biopower impact

Edward Ross Dickinson 4, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, Central European History, Vol. 37 No. 1, p. 34-36

And it is, of course, embedded in a broader discursive complex (institutions, professions, fields of social, medical, and psychological expertise) that pursues these same aims in often even more effective and inescapable ways.89 In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable.¶ Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies.¶ In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90¶ Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. ¶ This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.91

#### Rejecting sovereignty exacerbates inequalities and prevents emancipation

Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches,” p139, google books

Critics of critical and emancipatory theory have raised pertinent problems in terms both of the idealism of critical approaches and their problematic relationship to contemporary liberal intervention. Critical theorists themselves are aware that their prescriptions seem to be hard to separate from contemporary discourses and practices of power, yet critical theorists do not seem to be able to offer any understanding of why this might be. However, the limitations to critical and emancipatory approaches cannot be overcome by distinguishing themselves from liberal internationalist policy. In fact a closer engagement with contemporary security policies and discourse would show the similarities with critical theory and that both suffer from the same limitations.¶ The limitations of critical and emancipatory approaches are to be found in critical prescriptions in the contemporary political context. Jahn is right to argue that critical theory is idealistic, but this needs to be explained why. Douzinas is right to argue that critical theory becomes a justification for power and this needs to be explained why. The reasons for this remain undertheorised. I argue here that critical and emancipatory approaches lack a fundamental understanding of what is at stake in the political realm. For critical theorists the state and sovereignty represent oppressive structures that work against human freedom. There is much merit to this critique of the inequities of the state system. However, the problem is that freedom or emancipation are not simply words that can breathe life into international affairs but in the material circumstances of the contemporary world must be linked to political constituencies, that is men and women who can give content to that freedom and make freedom a reality. ¶ Critical and emancipatory theorists fail to understand that there must be a political content to emancipation and new forms of social organisation. Critical theorists seek emancipation and argue for new forms of political community above and beyond the state, yet there is nothing at the moment beyond the state that can give real content to those wishes. There is no democratic world government and it is simply nonsensical to argue that the UN, for example, is a step towards global democracy. Major international institutions are essentially controlled by powerful states. To welcome challenges to sovereignty in the present political context cannot hasten any kind of more just world order in which people really matter (to paraphrase Lynch). Whatever the limitations of the state, and there are many, at the moment the state represents the only framework in which people might have a chance to have some meaningful control over their lives.

#### Causes intervention and inequality

Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches,” p138, google books

It seems clear that since the 1990s and the shift away from formal framework for international affairs in terms of formal sovereign equality and non intervention, weak and troubled states have become increasingly opened up to interference and intervention by great powers. There is no global political constituency in existence and the world order as it currently is one in which power is unevenly distributed. Shifting away from even formal prohibitions against intervention and formal sovereign equality simply gives more powerful states greater power. This cannot represent a step towards greater emancipation for the citizens of those states, in fact it represents an increasing lack of freedom. For contemporary critical theorists, there is a failure to understand that rights are not things in themselves that can create freedom. In certain concrete situations human rights can easily become their opposite, a system in which external powers become sovereign. For this reason, a critical approach must entail an engagement with the here and now and the exercise of contemporary power relations, but this is exactly what contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists are not doing.

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### Case---AT: Movements DA

#### There’s a sustainable consensus on the drone program---no chance of judicial, legislative, diplomatic, or domestic political constraints---detention policy empirically proves

Robert Chesney 12, professor at the University of Texas School of Law, nonresident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution, distinguished scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, 8/29/12, “Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138623>

This multi-year pattern of cross-branch and cross-party consensus gives the impression that the legal architecture of detention has stabilized at last. But the settlement phenomenon is not limited to detention policy. The same thing has happened, albeit to a lesser extent, in other areas.

The military commission prosecution system provides a good example. When the Obama administration came into office, it seemed quite possible, indeed likely, that it would shut down the commissions system. Indeed, the new president promptly ordered all commission proceedings suspended pending a policy review.48 In the end, however, the administration worked with the then Democratic-controlled Congress to pursue a mend-it-don’t-end-it approach culminating in passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2009, which addressed a number of key objections to the statutory framework Congress and the Bush administration had crafted in 2006. In his National Archives address in spring 2009, moreover, President Obama also made clear that he would make use of this system in appropriate cases.49 He has duly done so, notwithstanding his administration’s doomed attempt to prosecute the so-called “9/11 defendants” (especially Khalid Sheikh Mohamed) in civilian courts. Difficult questions continue to surround the commissions system as to particular issues—such as the propriety of charging “material support” offenses for pre-2006 conduct50—but the system as a whole is far more stable today than at any point in the past decade.51

There have been strong elements of cross-party continuity between the Bush and Obama administration on an array of other counterterrorism policy questions, including the propriety of using rendition in at least some circumstances and, perhaps most notably, the legality of using lethal force not just in contexts of overt combat deployments but also in areas physically remote from the “hot battlefield.” Indeed, the Obama administration quickly outstripped the Bush administration in terms of the quantity and location of its airstrikes outside of Afghanistan,52 and it also greatly surpassed the Bush administration in its efforts to marshal public defenses of the legality of these actions.53 What’s more, the Obama administration also succeeded in fending off a lawsuit challenging the legality of the drone strike program (in the specific context of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen and member of AQAP known to be on a list of approved targets for the use of deadly force in Yemen who was in fact killed in a drone strike some months later).54

The point of all this is not to claim that legal disputes surrounding these counterterrorism policies have effectively ended. Far from it; a steady drumbeat of criticism persists, especially in relation to the use of lethal force via drones. But by the end of the first post-9/11 decade, this criticism no longer seemed likely to spill over in the form of disruptive judicial rulings, newly-restrictive legislation, or significant spikes in diplomatic or domestic political pressure, as had repeatedly occurred in earlier years. Years of law-conscious policy refinement—and quite possibly some degree of public fatigue or inurement when it comes to legal criticisms—had made possible an extended period of cross-branch and cross-party consensus, and this in turn left the impression that the underlying legal architecture had reached a stage of stability that was good enough for the time being.

### Case---AT: Circumvention

#### No circumvention

Stephen I. Vladeck 9, associate professor at American University Washington College of Law, 2009, "The Long War, The Federal Courts, and the Necessity/Legality Paradox," 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. ahttps://webspace.utexas.edu/rmc2289/LT/Vladeck.Short.pdf

The problem is that such a belief is based on a series of assumptions that Wittes does not attempt to prove. First, he assumes that the Executive Branch would ignore a judicial decision invalidating action that might be justified by military necessity. While Jackson may arguably have had credible reason to fear such conduct (given his experience with both the Gold Clause Cases 140 and the “switch in time”), 141 a lot has changed in the past six-and-a-half decades, to the point where I, at least, cannot imagine a contemporary President possessing the political capital to expressly refuse to enforce a Supreme Court decision. But perhaps I’m naïve

#### Posner and Vermeule are wrong---external checks are effective

Aziz Z. Huq 12, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, "Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics)", May 25, www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/400-ah-binding.pdf

Paulson ’ s genuflection and Obama ’ s reticence, I will contend here, are symptomatic of our political system ’ s operation rather than being aberration al . It is generally the case that even in the heart of crisis, and even on matters where executive competence is supposedly at an acme , legislators employ formal institutional powers not only to delay executive initiatives but also affirmatively to end presidential policies. 20 Numerous examples from recent events illustrate the point. Congressional adversaries of Obama, for instance, cut off his policy of emptying Guantánamo Bay via appropriations riders. 21 Deficit hawks spent 2011 resisting the President’s solutions to federal debt, while the President declined to short - circuit negotiations with unilateral action. 22 Even in military matters, a growing body of empirical research suggests Congress often successfully influences the course of overseas engagements to a greater degree than legal scholars have discerned or acknowledged. 23¶ That work suggests that the failure of absolute congressional control over military matters cannot be taken as evidence of “the inability of law to constrain the executive ” in more subtle ways (p 5). The conventional narrative of executive dominance , in other words, is at best incomplete and demands supplementing .¶ This Review uses The Executive Unbound as a platform to explore how the boundaries of discretionary executive action are established. As the controversial national security policies of the Bush administration recede in time, the issue of executive power becomes ripe for reconsideration. Arguments for or against binding the executive are starting to lose their partisan coloration. There is more room to investigate the dynamics of executive power in a purely positive fashion without the impinging taint of ideological coloration.¶ Notwithstanding this emerging space for analys i s, t here is still surprising inattention to evidence of whether the executive is constrained and to the positive question of how constraint works. The Executive Unbound is a significant advance because it takes seriously this second “ mechanism question. ” Future studies of the executive branch will ignore its i mportant and trenchant analysis at their peril. 24 Following PV ’ s lead, I focus on the descriptive , positive question of how the executive is constrained . I do speak briefly and in concluding to normative matters . B ut f irst and foremost, my arguments should be understood as positive and not normative in nature unless otherwise noted.¶ Articulating and answering the question “ W hat binds the executive ?” , The Executive Unbound draws a sharp line between legal and political constraints on discretion — a distinction between laws and institutions on the one hand, and the incentives created by political competition on the other hand . While legal constraints usually fail, it argues, political constraints can prevail. PV thus postulate what I call a “strong law/ politics dichotomy. ” My central claim in this Review is that this strong law/politics dichotomy cannot withstand scrutiny. While doctrinal scholars exaggerate law ’s autonomy, I contend, the realists PV underestimate the extent to which legal rules and institutions play a pivotal role in the production of executive constraint. Further, the political mechanisms they identify as substitutes for legal checks cannot alone do the work of regulating executive discretion. Diverging from both legalist and realist positions, I suggest that law and politics do not operate as substitutes in the regulation of executive authority. 25 They instead work as interlocking complements. An account of the borders of executive discretion must focus on the interaction of partisan and electoral forces on the one hand and legal rules. It must specify the conditions under which the interaction of political actors’ exertions and legal rules will prove effective in limiting such discretion.

### Case---AT: Rubberstamp

#### Ex post solves

Paul Taylor 13, Senior Fellow at the Center for Policy & Research with a focus on national security policy, international relations, targeted killings, and drone operations, JD from Seton Hall University School of Law, “A FISC for Drones?” http://transparentpolicy.org/2013/02/a-fisc-for-drones/

Judges would likely be much more comfortable with ex post review. Ex post review would free them from any implication that they are issuing a “death warrant” and would place them in a position that they are much more comfortable with: reviewing executive uses of force after the fact. While there are clearly parallels that could be drawn between the ex ante review proposed here and the search and seizure warrants that judges routinely deal with, there are also important differences. First and foremost is that this implicates not the executive’s law enforcement responsibility but its war-making and foreign relations responsibilities, with which courts are loath to interfere, but are sometimes willing to review for abuse.¶ Additionally, in search and seizure warranting, there an ex post review will eventually be available. That will likely not be the case in drone strikes and other targeted killings unless such a process is specifically created. There are simply too many hurdles to judicial review (including state secrets, political questions, discovery problems, etc) for the courts to create such an opportunity without congressional action.¶ Chesney also noted that executive officials involved in the nomination process would prefer an ex ante review to shield them from unexpected civil liability by the victims or their families. I’m sure that it is true that administration officials would like to have “certainty ex ante that they would not face a lawsuit.” However, this is not a guarantee that the courts can provide to the executive. As noted above, as with search and seizure warrants, there are issues to consider after the approval of the executive action. Ex ante review does not allow for inquiry into important ancillary issues, such as the balancing of risk to civilian bystanders. Also, it provides no assurances that new, exculpatory intelligence forces a reassessment of the targeting decision. Only ex post review would achieve this.¶ There is also the problem that typified the FISC: permissiveness. Of the tens of thousands of FISA warrant requests, only a handful have been rejected. When allowing for modification of the requests, it is not clear whether any have been finally rejected. There is little reason to believe that the proposed “drone court” will be much different. It is far too likely that a court will hesitate to impede an operation that the executive believes is required to protect out national security. Once the operation is complete, however, the court will not be inclined to hold back its criticism on all manner of aspects of the operation, from the initial targeting decision to the final execution.

### Kritik---Prior Questions Bad

#### Prior questions will never be fully settled---must take action even under conditions of uncertainty

Molly Cochran 99, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

### Kritik---Legal Debates Good

#### Legal debates that teach us the language of experts are key to solve --- alt fails

McClean 1, (David E. “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Am. Phil. Conf., [www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm](http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm))

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details

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 where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

### Kritik---Cede Political/Right Fill In

#### The right fills in

Orly Lobel 7, University of San Diego Assistant Professor of Law, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics,” 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf

Both the practical failures and the fallacy of rigid boundaries generated by extralegal activism rhetoric permit us to broaden our inquiry to the underlying assumptions of current proposals regarding transformative politics — that is, attempts to produce meaningful changes in the political and socioeconomic landscapes. The suggested alternatives produce a new image of social and political action. This vision rejects a shared theory of social reform, rejects formal programmatic agendas, and embraces a multiplicity of forms and practices. Thus, it is described in such terms as a plan of no plan,211 “a project of projects,”212 “anti-theory theory,”213 politics rather than goals,214 presence rather than power,215 “practice over theory,”216 and chaos and openness over order and formality. As a result, the contemporary message rarely includes a comprehensive vision of common social claims, but rather engages in the description of fragmented efforts. As Professor Joel Handler argues, the commonality of struggle and social vision that existed during the civil rights movement has disappeared.217 There is no unifying discourse or set of values, but rather an aversion to any metanarrative and a resignation from theory. Professor Handler warns that this move away from grand narratives is self-defeating precisely because only certain parts of the political spectrum have accepted this new stance: “[T]he opposition is not playing that game . . . . [E]veryone else is operating as if there were Grand Narratives . . . .”218 Intertwined with the resignation from law and policy, the new bromide of “neither left nor right” has become axiomatic only for some.219 The contemporary critical legal consciousness informs the scholarship of those who are interested in progressive social activism, but less so that of those who are interested, for example, in a more competitive securities market. Indeed, an interesting recent development has been the rise of “conservative public interest lawyer[ing].”220 Although “public interest law” was originally associated exclusively with liberal projects, in the past three decades conservative advocacy groups have rapidly grown both in number and in their vigorous use of traditional legal strategies to promote their causes.221 This growth in conservative advocacy is particularly salient in juxtaposition to the decline of traditional progressive advocacy. Most recently, some thinkers have even suggested that there may be “something inherent in the left’s conception of social change — focused as it is on participation and empowerment — that produces a unique distrust of legal expertise.

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”222¶ Once again, this conclusion reveals flaws parallel to the original disenchantment with legal reform. Although the new extralegal frames present themselves as apt alternatives to legal reform models and as capable of producing significant changes to the social map, in practice they generate very limited improvement in existing social arrangements. Most strikingly, the cooptation effect here can be explained in terms of the most profound risk of the typology — that of legitimation. The common pattern of extralegal scholarship is to describe an inherent instability in dominant structures by pointing, for example, to grassroots strategies,223 and then to assume that specific instances of counterhegemonic activities translate into a more complete transformation. This celebration of multiple micro-resistances seems to rely on an aggregate approach — an idea that the multiplication of practices will evolve into something substantial. In fact, the myth of engagement obscures the actual lack of change being produced, while the broader pattern of equating extralegal activism with social reform produces a false belief in the potential of change. There are few instances of meaningful reordering of social and economic arrangements and macro-redistribution. Scholars write about decoding what is really happening, as though the scholarly narrative has the power to unpack more than the actual conventional experience will admit.224 Unrelated efforts become related and part of a whole through mere reframing. At the same time, the elephant in the room — the rising level of economic inequality — is left unaddressed and comes to be understood as natural and inevitable.225 This is precisely the problematic process that critical theorists decry as losers’ self-mystification, through which marginalized groups come to see systemic losses as the product of their own actions and thereby begin to focus on minor achievements as representing the boundaries of their willed reality. ¶ The explorations of micro-instances of activism are often fundamentally performative, obscuring the distance between the descriptive and the prescriptive. The manifestations of extralegal activism — the law and organizing model; the proliferation of informal, soft norms and norm-generating actors; and the celebrated, separate nongovernmental sphere of action — all produce a fantasy that change can be brought about through small-scale, decentralized transformation. The emphasis is local, but the locality is described as a microcosm of the whole and the audience is national and global. In the context of the humanities, Professor Carol Greenhouse poses a comparable challenge to ethnographic studies from the 1990s, which utilized the genres of narrative and community studies, the latter including works on American cities and neighborhoods in trouble.226 The aspiration of these genres was that each individual story could translate into a “time of the nation” body of knowledge and motivation.227 In contemporary legal thought, a corresponding gap opens between the local scale and the larger, translocal one. In reality, although there has been a recent proliferation of associations and grassroots groups, few new local-statenational federations have emerged in the United States since the 1960s and 1970s, and many of the existing voluntary federations that flourished in the mid-twentieth century are in decline.228 There is, therefore, an absence of links between the local and the national, an absent intermediate public sphere, which has been termed “the missing middle” by Professor Theda Skocpol.229 New social movements have for the most part failed in sustaining coalitions or producing significant institutional change through grassroots activism. Professor Handler concludes that this failure is due in part to the ideas of contingency, pluralism, and localism that are so embedded in current activism.230 Is the focus on small-scale dynamics simply an evasion of the need to engage in broader substantive debate? ¶ It is important for next-generation progressive legal scholars, while maintaining a critical legal consciousness, to recognize that not all extralegal associational life is transformative. We must differentiate, for example, between inward-looking groups, which tend to be self-regarding and depoliticized, and social movements that participate in political activities, engage the public debate, and aim to challenge and reform existing realities.231 We must differentiate between professional associations and more inclusive forms of institutions that act as trustees for larger segments of the community.232 As described above, extralegal activism tends to operate on a more divided and hence a smaller scale than earlier social movements, which had national reform agendas. Consequently, within critical discourse there is a need to recognize the limited capacity of small-scale action. We should question the narrative that imagines consciousness-raising as directly translating into action and action as directly translating into change. Certainly not every cultural description is political. Indeed, it is questionable whether forms of activism that are opposed to programmatic reconstruction of a social agenda should even be understood as social movements. In fact, when groups are situated in opposition to any form of institutionalized power, they may be simply mirroring what they are fighting against and merely producing moot activism that settles for what seems possible within the narrow space that is left in a rising convergence of ideologies. The original vision is consequently coopted, and contemporary discontent is legitimated through a process of self-mystification.

### Alt Fails

#### wholesale rejection of legal reform fails---the system’s inevitable, we must use pragmatic policy change to reform it

John Stick 86, Assistant Professor of Law at Tulane University School of Law, “Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 2 (Dec., 1986), pp. 332-401, JSTOR

Singer suggests that we can throw away the way we talk about law and start again. We should do so, he claims, because the way judges usually describe the law in opinions distorts our vision and frustrates our purposes. If we begin to speak simply, we can end hunger, assuage loneliness, and deconstruct illegitimate hierarchies.¶ Singer wants to throw away the tradition not only for the intellec- tual reasons he gives, but also because he wants to replace the mod- erately liberal political theory underlying our legal tradition with a more radical political theory. Rather than argue that a more radical political theory flows from the best parts of the liberal tradition, Singer suggests that his radical theory is totally incompatible with liberalism and can be embraced only if liberalism is rejected root and branch. In advancing this proposal, Singer's discussion is typical of the nihilist strand of critical legal studies and the style of arguments it gives. Although my political values are similar to Singer's, I think it is a mistake to deny liberalism totally rather than to attempt to refine it, and I think the reasons that Singer's stance is a mistake are evident in his misuse of pragmatism. Pragmatism never suggested that it was so easy to begin again, or that it was necessary to throw out so much to avoid error.¶ Rorty cautions against the very step Singer makes. In the intro- duction to his book of essays,268 Rorty refers approvingly to an anal- ysis of language that sees language not as "a medium in which we try to form pictures of reality"269 but instead as a tool.270 Language as a medium conveys truth if the picture it conveys is the same as the real thing that is pictured: language as a tool conveys truth if it works. But Rorty warns that the view of language as a tool should not be taken to suggest that we can escape its influence, examine it separately from anything else, and ask if it is adequate to achieve our purposes. He writes:¶ But there is no way to think about either the world or our purposes except by using our language. One can use language to criticize and enlarge itself, as one can exercise one's body to develop and strengthen and enlarge it, but one cannot see language-as-a-whole in relation to something else to which it applies, or for which it is a means to an end.271¶ Singer argues that traditional legal discourse distorts our vision and frustrates our purposes and therefore should be totally rejected. This argument assumes the existence of independent measures both of the truth of legal and moral argument and of our real moral purposes.272 It assumes we can start again and see these things fresh. But the whole point of pragmatism and Rorty's argument is that we cannot start over, and we cannot see things fresh. We cannot escape our language, or our standards of rational thought, to judge them.¶ What we can do is judge one discourse by the standards of another, or in other words, use one part of our language to evaluate another part. In this way, Singer could try to persuade us to accept a different set of moral purposes and rational standards for law. He might have a socialist or anarchist vision of law, and he could try to convince us that his vision is a more attractive way of life judged by some of our own old values. If he wanted to succeed, he would try to show how his vision was a culmination of parts of our own tradition and avoided acknowledged problems in our own theories.273¶ But in his attempt to persuade, Singer either would be giving political arguments that his system was better, or would be giving rational arguments that his theory provided a better rational expla- nation of our experience of legal practice on our own terms. What he would not be doing is merely claiming that our standards of rationality were inherently wrong.¶ The nihilists consistently oversimplify and misrepresent the liberal tradition in legal theory. In particular, liberal theory is open to passionate moral and political discussion.

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 The difference between the liberals and critical legal theorists is not fundamentally methodological. Nor is it that critical legal studies understands pragmatism, hermeneutics, deconstructionism, or other fancy intellectual tools while the liberals do not.274 The main difference is, after all, political. If liberal theory takes current institutional structures too much for granted, the contribution critical legal studies can make is to point out the dirty facts the liberal ignores or to dream new structures that even the liberals can see are more just. Methodological skirmishing is a diversion critical legal studies cannot afford, especially when it is wrong on the methodological issue.¶ The difference between Singer and the liberals is not that Singer is willing to open legal discourse to political discussion while the liberals are not. The difference is not even that Singer, or other critical legal theorists, wish to open discussion about the standards of legal rationality to political debate,275 because many liberals openly embrace such a political discussion.276 The difference between Singer and the liberals is that Singer does not think that political discussion, whether framed in moral or legal terms, leads anywhere,277 and most of the liberals do.278 Singer thinks we just choose our moral and political stands, and that rationality applied to morals can be only rationalization after the fact. Singer states that we should not expect or strive for agreement as a result of rational discussion.279 For the liberals, however, rational discussion is the most important noncoercive way of achieving agreement.¶ Singer and other critical legal scholars suggest that liberal legal theory's attachment to rationality is philosophically archaic and na- ive.280 They claim that developments in philosophy over the last few hundred years illustrate the death of reason.28' Such a claim appears plausible only if recent intellectual history and liberal legal theory are greatly distorted by ignoring the dominant tradition in Anglo-Ameri- can philosophy, as well as much of continental philosophy. A strong belief in the death of reason is present in some continental European thought, but strong rationalist traditions remain.282 Those American theorists whose positions are closest to the nihilists, such as Paul Feyerabend,283 are the mavericks of American philosophy. Many of the authors cited for the contemporary decline of rationalism, such as Richard Rorty and Thomas Kuhn, deny one form of rationalism only to preserve another.284 Critical legal scholars who attempt to support irrationalism by claiming the support of the bulk of contemporary philosophy fail to make their case. ¶ The other side of the irrationalists' misunderstanding is their simplified version of liberal legal rationality. As I have tried to show, some liberal legal and political theorists have a sophisticated account of rationality similar to that of the American and European theorists the irrationalists claim to follow. Singer's account of moral reasoning, which involves intuitive choice unconstrained by community standards concerning moral language, is not nearly as similar to the European hermeneutic tradition as are the accounts of moral language and rationality of such liberal theorists as John Rawls285 and Ronald Dworkin.286 Singer's view that we cannot expect to achieve agreement through rational conversation is more hermetic than hermeneutic- more reminiscent of life in a cloister than in a community. ¶ If I am right, critical legal studies should be spending its time arguing with traditional scholarship about politics, not about meth- odological issues.287 Mechanical jurisprudence has already been defeated. The liberals, if not the social choice theorists and law and economics scholars, have already admitted discussion of politics into traditional legal discourse. Recalcitrant theorists of neutrality and geometric legal reasoning are being challenged more effectively by liberals or critical legal rationalists than by critical legal nihilists.288 The standard critical methodological arguments against the more sophisticated liberals are consistently overstated and only demolish straw men. 289 ¶ The broad issue that truly divides critical legal scholars and liberals is politics. Most critical legal scholars believe that our society can become just only if transformed according to the insights of socialism, syndicalism, or radical feminism.290 Liberals disagree. Critical legal scholarship should elucidate ideals and point out how our present society falls short. The model of critical legal scholarship should be feminist scholarship or Richard Abel's series of articles on a socialist approach to risk and tort.29' The model should not be various examples of trashing.292 ¶ Critical legal studies should also develop a theory of social change. The nihilists defend trashing as a means of social change: they identify ideology as the main block to social change and propose trashing as the scholar's most effective weapon against entrenched ideology.293 What we need to do, they claim, is to jump entirely out of the old ideology into something new. The pragmatic account of rationality I have presented leads to a very different prescription for attempting large social change. The rules of rationality in a pragmatist account, although less definite and explicit than the rules of rationality presupposed by neoclassical jurisprudence and nihilism alike, are harder to do without. Like lexical rules of meaning or grammar, we need not have rules of rationality in mind to use them. Yet we cannot just set them aside and start over. We can consciously set aside particular rules only because we have many other common assumptions about meaning, rationality, and the way the world is. The result is that we can to some extent change our traditions, our standards, and our values. Indeed, they change constantly even without our reflective choice. But the changes are partial, much of the old tradition remains intact, and the new material is usually part of the old tradition transformed. ¶ My conclusion from these commonplace observations is that critical legal studies must claim to be the true heir of the liberal tradition, not its pallbearer. If critical legal studies cannot make the convincing argument, under (at least some of) the liberals' own standards, that critical legal studies is the fairest flower of the liberal tradition, it will not succeed. If critical legal studies listens to the nihilists, it will never even attempt the argument.